



STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION PROGRAM—
INFORMATION CENTERS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

5 Conf. Ser.
EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Res. 40

A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS TO EMPLOY TEMPORARY
ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL AND INCREASING THE LIMIT
OF EXPENDITURES

MAY 5, 1953

PART 5

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations



UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1953

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STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION PROGRAM—
Information Centers

TUESDAY, MAY 5, 1953

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to Senate Resolution 40, agreed to January 30, 1953, at 2:45 p. m., in room 357 of the Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin; Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat, Missouri; Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat, Washington.

Present also: Roy M. Cohn, chief counsel; Howard Rushmore, research director; Daniel G. Buckley, assistant counsel; Donald A. Surine, assistant counsel; Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wechsler, the only remaining evidence we had requested was the list of those whom you either knew to be members of the Communist Party or members of the Young Communist League. In order to submit those, I got the impression from your wire that you felt that that was a condition precedent to the making the record public.

That is not the case. I took the matter up with the committee, and they voted unanimously to give me permission to make the record public at the earliest possible moment; that is, after you have had a chance to correct it. So the order is that you give us those names and has nothing to do with making the record public, I want you to know that.

Also I think you were advised you could submit any additional material you cared to. There is some question about what part of the material should be made a part of the written record, what should be received as exhibits. Normally documents are not reproduced in the record itself because of the prohibitive cost. However, in this case in view of the apparent interest in it, I think we should extend ourselves to put in the printed record as much of the material as you strongly feel should be a part of the record. Otherwise, if you could submit copies of the exhibits so they will be available for the record, it would be helpful.

I would suggest after your testimony is completed that you meet with Mr. Cohn here and work out what corrections you want made, what materials which are not now a part of the record you think ought to be a part of the record, and if you cannot agree, I would be glad to call in Senator Symington to get an agreement.

TESTIMONY OF JAMES A. WECHSLER, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, MARVIN BERGER, HEAD, LEGAL DEPARTMENT, NEW YORK POST—Resumed

Mr. WECHSLER. Senator, it was my understanding from your telegram that you indicated the record would be made public upon the completion of my testimony, which involved the submission of this list. I should like in submitting the list, despite what you have said, to make a statement which would preface the list. I should like to make it because it includes a series of comments as to what the disposal of the list should be, which is an issue that still confronts us.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say that I think you were justified in arriving at the conclusion that the record would not be made public until the list is submitted. I think my wire did indicate that we perhaps would not make the record public until your testimony was completed.

I want you to know today, however, that the giving of the list is not a condition precedent to making the balance of the testimony public; that you are ordered to give the list today.

Mr. WECHSLER. Senator, may I make the statement that I prepared and proceed from that with the statement that you will put in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. WECHSLER. In view of Senator McCarthy's insistence that the transcript of my hearing could not be released until I "completed" my testimony in this manner, I am today submitting to the Senate investigating committee a list of persons whom I knew to be Communists in the period when I was a member of the Young Communists League—from April 1934 through December 1937. I was 18 when I joined the Young Communist League.

In now presenting this list, I am urging the committee to exclude it from the record in view of the damage that might be done innocent people by its inclusion.

This sweeping inquiry addressed to me by Senator McCarthy, involving so remote a period of time, was presumably designed to create the false impression that I have resisted the inquiries of appropriate Government agencies and to obscure my long, affirmative public record of anti-Communist activity and writing.

I therefore felt I had no alternative except to submit this list so that the true issue at stake in this proceeding could not be distorted.

From the moment Senator McCarthy summoned me to Washington, it has been my conviction that he has raised grave questions of freedom of the press worthy of full investigation by the American Society of Newspaper Editors. I do not propose to allow anyone to cloud that issue.

The CHAIRMAN. If the American Society of Newspaper Editors does comply with your request—which I doubt—I hope they extend their investigation to the lack of ethics and the lack of truth in the newspaper which you edit. I also hope they investigate your abuse of freedom of the press and your low ethical standards as a newspaperman.

Now, Mr. Wechsler, may I ask you this: I know you have made that statement before, that this was directed at the freedom of the press. We have been calling authors who are not newsmen; we called,

I believe, 50 or 60 authors, 2 or 3 or 4 were professors, 1 newsman. None of the other professions raised the question that it was interfering with the freedom of their profession.

The professors did raise that question, that we were interfering with academic freedom by exposing their Communist background. You, as the only newspaperman called up to this time, had taken the position that we had no right to call you. Can I ask you this question: If you were not a newsman, if you were a lawyer or a banker, and you had written books that were on the information shelves, if we had the information that at one time at least you were so important in the Communist movement that you were on the National Committee for the Young Communist League, if we found that you had gone to Moscow under the direction of the Young Communist League and came back and then announced that both you and your wife had decided to break with the Communist Party, and if the committee, either rightly or wrongly, decided that there was no change in your public activities after this alleged break, and let us assume you are not a newspaperman, do you think we would then have the right to call you and try to find out what your works were being used for?

Mr. WECHSLER. Senator, it is for the Senate of the United States in the last analysis to determine the scope of any inquiry, and I stand on that position. I believe, however, that if you would allow me to complete my statement that I will address myself in the course of it to the question raised, and I will be glad then to have you resubmit the question if you feel I have not answered it.

The CHAIRMAN. If you would rather complete your statement without interruption.

Mr. WECHSLER. I think it might simplify and help.

Mr. COHN. Mr. Chairman, are you waiving the 24-hour rule that all statements must be filed with this committee 24 hours in advance? We received no copy of the statement.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. I have seen Mr. Wechsler to the best of my knowledge once before in my life. He is the editor of the Post. The publisher and the publisher's brother I have known for many years. I might add that there is a split in the family; one is a Democrat and one is a Republican. I would ask that you extend any courtesy to the witness you could that would be appropriate.

In this case, I would appreciate your waiving the rule at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is a reasonable suggestion, Senator Symington.

While normally, Mr. Wechsler, we have a rule under the Reorganization Act that statements must be submitted 72 hours ahead of time, this committee has cut that time down to 24 hours. I assume you were not aware of that rule. You are here now prepared to testify; the press understands the testimony will be released in the morning, and I think Senator Symington's suggestion is well taken, and we will waive the time rule.

Senator SYMINGTON. Could I add one point?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am sure you could not have known. I went out of town Thursday, and I am sure it was entirely a coincidence Mr. Wechsler was going to be here Friday. I felt that I should be

here when Mr. Wechsler came, under the circumstances. However, unfortunately I was in Georgia.

MR. WECHSLER. Senator, if you will bear with me, with my rhetoric, I would like to finish this, and I think I will address myself to your question.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

MR. WECHSLER. I believe Senator McCarthy instituted this whole proceeding as a reprisal against a newspaper and its editor for their opposition to the methods of this committee's chairman.

In short, I believe I have been called here by Senator McCarthy, not because of anything I wrote or did 15 or 18 years ago—none of which I have ever concealed—but because of what my newspaper has said about the committee's chairman in very recent times.

The fact that a book I wrote was reportedly found in an Information Service library overseas hardly warrants this large-scale examination—especially in view of my known hostility to communism over so many years. Incidentally, I have not yet even been told which book it was or where it was found, but Senator McCarthy has been quoted publicly as saying it was my book on John L. Lewis—a book which contains a full chapter describing the destructive operations of Communists in the labor movement.

Senator McCarthy has in fact been conducting an examination of the policies and personnel of the Post, a newspaper which, if I may say so, has been as equally resolute in its opposition to communism as to attacks on liberty from any other high or low quarter.

Neither the Post nor I have anything to hide. Despite our stated opinion about the impropriety of this inquiry, I have answered all questions to the best of my ability.

But now it is being carried to a point where defenseless people may be hurt.

Many of those on the list I am submitting were young people who joined the Young Communist League out of deeply idealistic motivations in a time of uncertainty and insecurity nearly two decades ago. Even as the shadow of depression lifted the rise of aggressive fascism created new anxieties which blinded many of them to the basic similarities between communism and fascism. They were fooled, as I was. I know that some of them have repudiated communism as decisively as I did and, where I have personal knowledge of that fact, I have so indicated on the list. But it is highly probable that numerous others with whom I have had utterly no contact in the last 15 years or more have similarly changed their views and allegiances. The inclusion of their names in the record of this hearing could do them irreparable harm and serve no conceivable national purpose.

It could actually serve to undermine the fight against communism.

I say this in all earnestness: If not only I but others who have long ago broken with communism can be subjected at this late date to this kind of attack for the political errors of youth, young people who are now similarly realizing they have been misled by the Communists may bitterly decide there is no way in which they can honorably regain their status in a democratic society.

I, therefore, ask this committee to recognize a deep moral responsibility to prevent the abuse of this information which its inclusion

in the record would surely invite. Surely the proper disposal of this list would be its transmission to the FBI.

The bulk of those on the list were not professional hardened Communists. If I had had the misfortune to be lured into the sinister espionage underground of the Communist movement, I would long ago have felt a deep obligation to identify the conspirators. I knew of no one engaged in such activity. Actually, many on this list, like myself, were engaged in promoting such public propaganda activities as peace demonstrations, campaigns in defense of academic freedom, and assistance to union organizing drives. I long ago became aware of the degree to which many of these activities were manipulated by the Communists for their own cynical purposes, but that was not then apparent to many of the participants. I feel compelled to make this point in the light of certain insinuations by the chairman of this committee that my statements are unsatisfactory because they are insufficiently dramatic. Unlike some other former Communists who have appeared before congressional committees, my experience was comparatively brief and distinctly unhistoric. I never got any pumpkin papers.

I have spent my adult years as a journalist writing and speaking in behalf of the free institutions that one may most deeply appreciate if one has ever lived within the stifling orthodoxy of a Communist organization. I broke with communism for many reasons, but certainly a major reason was my discovery that no one could breathe or speak or think or write freely as a Communist. I found that communism was the enemy of freedom of thought, of justice, and of tolerance.

In the ensuing years I have tried to be more than a negative opponent of communism; I have tried to combat poverty, inequality, bigotry, and oppression in all their forms—for I know these are the conditions which make young men and women in any era susceptible to the false flags of communism. It is not enough, I believe, to be an anti-Communist; I have tried to establish my affirmative devotion to democratic principles—of which freedom of thought and speech and press are basic.

I have endeavored to combat those who, whether Communists, Fascists, or any other form of totalitarian, would destroy the spirit of dissent that has given grandeur to our Republic and who would enthrone the infamous doctrine that the end justifies the means.

It is under this credo that I have edited the Post.

A grave issue of conscience was involved in my decision to make this list available to the committee in view of the danger involved to innocent individuals. I am doing so because I believe the paramount issue is the attack which Senator McCarthy is waging upon the freedom of the press.

I reiterate my belief that Senator McCarthy is engaged in a primitive fishing expedition designed to silence independent newspaper comment.

That issue I shall ask the American Society of Newspaper Editors to weigh.

But in the interim I ask the committee to insure protection for those on the list who may be the innocent victims of this proceeding.

Now may I say, Senator, if I may add one word to your comment which preceded my testimony, if it had not been my understanding

that the release of the transcript was conditional upon my submission of this list, my response to your request would have been a proposal that I transmit this list without presentation to the committee directly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The CHAIRMAN. I am wondering why you did not do that years ago. This is the first time that you have made that suggestion. I wish you had done that when you say you first broke with the party or sometime in the interim. I wish you had supplied that list to the FBI.

Mr. WECHSLER. May I comment?

The CHAIRMAN. Glad to have you do that.

Mr. WECHSLER. Let me say first of all that I have been interviewed on many occasions by the FBI agents with regard to specific individuals. I have answered questions freely. At no time did the FBI request that I submit such a list, and it is precisely because now and before that I believe there are people on this list who have broken just as cleanly as I have that I felt no compulsion to submit such a document.

Let me add this, that had I, as I said in my statement, been aware of any of these individuals being engaged in espionage, sabotage, or any of the other activities that have been brought to light in recent years, certainly it would have been my responsibility to submit their names. But I am talking here in this list about a large number of young people who joined the Young Communist League in Columbia, people who joined for what I have indicated, what I have suggested were high-minded if misguided purposes.

I want to say in this connection, Senator, that in the inquiry the other day you took the view that I had been inadequately appreciative of the efforts of the FBI, yet I cannot help feeling that by the question you raise, that you in this situation are throwing a reflection on the functions and operations of that agency.

I repeat that at no time did the FBI ask me to submit what I must describe as a dragnet list, and I think it was because, as I understand it, the FBI would presumably not take the position that somebody who had been in the YCL in Columbia in 1934 ought to be subjected to large-scale inquiry unless there is some indication that he is occupying a position of any seriousness in the Government of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give us the list now, Mr. Wechsler?

Mr. WECHSLER. Senator, I had thought that I had asked a question, which was whether if I were, as I initially suggested, to transmit this list to the FBI, you would take the view that this was not a condition precedent.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not a condition precedent to the releasing of the balance of your testimony that you were ordered to submit the list of the members of the Communist Party which you have with you for the record. The committee will decide whether or when those names will be made a part of the public record. My inclination at this time is that they should not be made public until they have been very, very carefully checked by the staff, but you understand that we are not telling you in advance what we will do with the list.

You are not giving the committee the list as any reward for making the list public. You are giving the list because you are ordered to give it.

Senator SYMINGTON. May I say something?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am sorry that the voting on tidelands has made it difficult for some of the other Senators to be here, but I did talk to Senator Jackson about it, and I understand, and I talked to Senator McClellan, and this point was discussed. May I say for the minority, sir, that we believe that there is a point in the position taken by Mr. Wechsler. Take Mr. Rushmore here. If you were living in Mexico, Mo., and you had not disclosed the fact that you were a member of the Communist Party in your youth, you might be living up there quietly as a lawyer or writer, and if this business suddenly broke on the front page, you might take a gun and go off and shoot yourself. I do not want to make this too dramatic, but it seems to me that people might be badly hurt by this record being published, and in the interests of what I think is right, I respectfully ask the chairman to bring this matter up for discussion by the committee at his convenience.

The CHAIRMAN. As I say, my present thought, Senator, is that the list under no circumstances should be made public until it has been carefully checked by the staff, and then only after the committee has gone over it in executive session and decided whether or not some useful purpose will be served.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say that I will be extremely surprised if Mr. Wechsler submits the names of any Communists other than the well-known, well-exposed Communists. I will be very surprised, pleasantly surprised if he does so.

Mr. WECHSLER. Senator, I think that is a very serious statement you made.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us see the list then. I am hopeful I am wrong.

Mr. WECHSLER. The meditations and struggles of conscience that I have do not involve people whom I have reason to believe by their present affiliations with the Daily Worker or other public obviously Communist associations, are Communists. I am deeply concerned about the fact that more than half of this list includes names of people whose political whereabouts I have no idea.

It includes young people whom I knew in college.

Senator SYMINGTON. You say political whereabouts. Do you mean geographical whereabouts?

Mr. WECHSLER. Yes. Since I haven't seen them in 15, 16, or 17 years, I have no notion whether they have changed their ideas or not. There is reason to believe that many of them have changed their views. I may say that you have, in shifting what I understand to be the ground rules of this proceeding, raised an even deeper reason of conscience for me. You have stated that it is your belief that the list should not be released, but you have been emphatic to state that you give me no such assurance.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. We will give you no such assurance because that is a matter for the committee to decide. We do not make any promises to a witness. We order him to produce what he is bound to produce under the law, and we do not offer anything in return for that.

Mr. WECHSLER. Senator Symington, may I address an inquiry to you? Is it your view in the light of the situation that has developed

here that you think my obligation is as clear as it was to me to submit this list prior to the committee's decision on the publication of it?

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, the chairman has said, Mr. Wechsler, that he would not release the list without discussing it in executive session with the rest of the committee. On that basis, based on your telegram to him, as I remember it, I would submit the list at this time.

Mr. WECHSLER. Well, sir, you may remember that my telegram to him was premised on the assumption that my testimony would not be made public unless I first submitted the list to him.

(A short recess was taken.)

Mr. WECHSLER. I have been out of the room attempting to reach the publisher of the New York Post.

May I try to get clear where we are in this proceeding? You have withdrawn the conditional aspect of this list. It is my understanding that the transcript is to be issued, whatever I do about this list?

The CHAIRMAN. We have not withdrawn anything, Mr. Wechsler. You have been notified of that. You have been ordered to produce the list of Communists, Young Communist Leaguers, that you knew. That is the order now, the order to produce them.

Mr. WECHSLER. Senator, you prefaced the hearing by saying, as I understood you, that you planned to issue the transcript regardless?

The CHAIRMAN. We planned to issue the transcript regardless of what is done about the names. We do not intend to issue the names with the transcript at this time. You are not being made any promise as to whether or when any or all of the names might or might not be issued.

Mr. WECHSLER. Well, sir, that is the issue on which I would like to confer with the publisher before moving further. I believe this involves a very grave issue for a newspaper which has taken the view that such a list if made public could have disastrous consequences for individuals. I have taken the view——

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me be sure you understand, Mr. Wechsler. The chairman says he is going to publish your hearing regardless of what the decision is on the question of the publishing of the names. He has also said that before he publishes the names, he will call the executive committee, call the committee together in executive session.

Does majority rule control?

The CHAIRMAN. Majority rule controls unless there is dispute, and then we take it to the full committee.

Senator SYMINGTON. So I believe without being sure, that the majority would not want to release the names. I am impressed with your argument. This is my personal opinion that I am giving you. Based on some of the things the committee has been criticized for, like the death of some man out of Boston, I would not be for doing it.

Therefore, my advice would be, on the basis of this hearing and the telegrams as I dimly remember them, to submit the list. I offer that merely in an effort to be constructive.

Mr. WECHSLER. Sir, I think I understand where we are now, and I simply wish to repeat that I believe this is merely not a personal decision for me, but it affects the newspaper of which I am editor. Therefore, I was asking for the opportunity to confer with the publisher.

Mr. COHN. From a legal standpoint I do not understand what this is all about. A very simple direction has been made of the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. He can discuss the matter with counsel.

Incidentally, may we have this gentleman's name?

Mr. BERGER. Marvin Berger, B-e-r-g-e-r, attorney for the New York Post, and I appear here in connection with the relevance of testimony already given here by Mr. Wechsler in a number of libel suits in which the New York Post is presently involved.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wechsler may discuss this matter freely with counsel. If his publisher does not want him to give the names of the Communists that he knew, it does not have any effect upon the decision of the committee.

Mr. WECHSLER. I am aware of that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He has been ordered to give the list. I cannot see any objection to Mr. Wechsler taking the time to contact his publisher.

Mr. WECHSLER. Sir, may I make just one additional point on the record at this time? The issue is complicated by the fact of my belief that proceedings of executive hearings are not conducted in closed rooms. Last Sunday there was in a column widely published throughout the country a somewhat garbled version of testimony that I gave a week ago Friday.

Senator SYMINGTON. Whose column?

Mr. WECHSLER. A column written by a man named Winchell. It is a matter of open knowledge in the newspaper business that Mr. Rushmore who is sitting in this room is a continual news source for Mr. Winchell. I should hate to see this list given in the light of the discussion we have had here, and then see it published in the next 48 or 72 hours in that column.

By inserting it in the record it becomes privileged material. Obviously so long as it is off the record, it is not. I say this only to indicate the complexity of this decision.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say that I think you may be wrong as to when the matter becomes privileged. You have a lawyer here for advice. I do not believe it becomes privileged when taken in executive session. I think it is only when the record is made public by action of the committee that it becomes privileged, but that has no bearing on the question; that is just for your information.

Mr. WECHSLER. Sir, I believe that I could reach my publisher and come back here in 15 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is a reasonable request if you want to discuss it with her. May I say that the order still stands that you produce the list.

Mr. WECHSLER. I understand.

Senator SYMINGTON. May I suggest: First, come back as soon as you can, and secondly, do not be upset if we are off again on another call.

(A short recess was taken.)

Mr. WECHSLER. To avoid any suspense, let me say that it is my decision to turn over the list. I want to say that I have conferred with the publisher of the Post, who said it was my decision, and I have made it.

I want to say in turning this over that I do so in the light of the assurance of Senator Symington, his agreement with me, that the innocent people on this list should be protected; that every effort

should be made to preserve the anonymity which may surround them in the communities where they live.

Senator SYMINGTON. May I interrupt, if I may? I said that I would do my best with the committee to see that nobody was hurt.

Mr. WECHSLER. I understand.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am a member of the minority part of the committee, and as you know, I am not the chairman of the committee.

Mr. WECHSLER. I understand. I came here, and as I remarked earlier, found the ground rules changed, but I have no way of knowing how often they may be changed again, and it is my belief that to keep this issue clear there is going to be no question in this proceeding as to what my attitude is on communism. I want in turning over the list to register a final protest at the presence of a man in the room who writes a column for the Hearst press.

I do not see why, when a confidential document of this type is handed in, that no other member of the press should be permitted in the room, but he is permitted in the room.

Should I read the introduction to this list?

The CHAIRMAN. You may.

Mr. WECHSLER. To the best of my knowledge and recollection, following is a list of those whom I knew to be Communists in the period of my affiliation with the Young Communist League, beginning April 1934 and ending December 1937. Where I have definite knowledge that persons named on this list have become active anti-Communists in the ensuing period, I have indicated that with an asterisk—one of those happens to be my wife—with respect to some of those not so designated, it is apparent to me from the public record—such as affiliation with the Daily Worker—that they are still Communists; with respect to many others I have utterly no way of knowing what their political histories have been in the last 15 years, and my failure to designate them with an asterisk is not to be construed as an affirmative statement that they have continued their affiliation. I do not even have any conjecture about the present attitudes of more than half of those on the list.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will you give me your word of honor that these are all the Communists that you can remember?

Mr. WECHSLER. Yes, sir; and in making that statement let me state that I mean Communists; I do not mean people that went to a meeting or were momentarily in a parade, and so on; those whom I knew to be members.

Senator SYMINGTON. How long ago was it that you were in the Young Communist League?

Mr. WECHSLER. I left in December 1937, so that is a period of nearly 18 years.

Senator SYMINGTON. When did you start writing your first anti-Communist literature?

Mr. WECHSLER. Well, I went to work on a magazine where I had a rather obscure position for a while.

Senator SYMINGTON. Roughly what year?

Mr. WECHSLER. I would say that the record would show, I have additional exhibits with me which indicate that by 1939 I was not only writing but being attacked by the New Masses, which was a Communist magazine. I am supplementing the record with those exhibits.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wechsler, this list that you gave us I understand is the complete list of all the people you knew to be members of the Young Communist League or the Communist Party, is that correct?

Mr. WECHSLER. Whom I knew from my personal knowledge, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. WECHSLER. I did not go through a list of the central committee of the Communist Party in that period to give you names that everyone has. I assume that what you want is personal testimony based on personal experience.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, may I say something here?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. I want to make the record clear because Mr. Rushmore has been in the Communist Party, and has gotten out of the Communist Party, Mr. Wechsler has a point. Inasmuch as Mr. Wechsler has been in the Communist Party and has gotten out, if I were in Mr. Wechsler's position I believe that I would feel it was wrong to have a person who was a Communist when he was a Communist working for the committee checking for you, sir.

Mr. WECHSLER. Sir, may I clarify—

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment, please. May I say that I had every member of this staff checked through by the FBI. Mr. Rushmore has been of tremendous value not only to this committee but to other committees. He has been of great value to the FBI, and there is no one on this staff who has not had clearance. I just cannot think of anyone I could have as research director—

Senator SYMINGTON. I do not mean anything against Mr. Rushmore.

The CHAIRMAN. I have a list from Mr. Wechsler, and I had Mr. Rushmore and Mr. Cohn check it. They tell me at this point that apparently there are no names on here except names of those who have been publicly known as Communists or Young Communist Leaguers.

Mr. WECHSLER. Sir, that is not a true statement, and I do not believe Mr. Rushmore could make it under oath.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me finish. I need someone in a case like this at my right hand who knows the movement thoroughly at the time Mr. Wechsler was in it. Mr. Wechsler admits he was in the Communist movement.

Senator SYMINGTON. Can I make another statement?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Without saying anything against Mr. Rushmore, in my opinion, it is only fair to consider the word of Mr. Wechsler to be just as good as that of Mr. Rushmore.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not consider his word to be just as good, because Mr. Rushmore, since he broke with the movement, has been of great assistance to the FBI and congressional committees. This is the first time Mr. Wechsler has given a list of names.

Mr. WECHSLER. That statement, sir, is not consistent with the facts.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you give a list of names before?

Mr. WECHSLER. I was not asked for it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you answer every question asked by the FBI?

Mr. WECHSLER. I answered every question asked by the FBI.

Mr. COHN. Did you volunteer any statement to the FBI?

Mr. WECHSLER. As I stated last week.

Mr. COHN. You made a complaint because you thought your wife was being mistreated.

Mr. WECHSLER. Yes, sir; and in the course of that interview, Mr. Nichols asked that I make a statement, and I made one.

Mr. COHN. Did not Mr. Nichols ask you to give a statement concerning your activities in the Communist movement and to name everybody who had been associated with you?

Mr. WECHSLER. I gave what I assumed was a satisfactory reply to Mr. Nichols. I believe if it had not been satisfactory——

The CHAIRMAN. You did not name Joe Lash on this list?

Mr. WECHSLER. No, sir, and I think I testified quite fully on that point last Friday. My testimony on the point was that Joe Lash was unquestionably admittedly a fellow traveler of great dimensions. He did not hold membership in the Young Communist League to the best of my knowledge, and I believe I have such knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wechsler, you were a member of the National Committee of the Young Communist League, were you not?

Mr. WECHSLER. For a period of a few months. Let me add that I was a member as representative of the Student Union group in the Young Communist movement. I was there because I was an official of the American Student Union. I attended meetings, I would say a number of meetings which I attended, held on Saturday, which was called the Bureau of the Young Communist League and was definitely limited. That to the best of my knowledge and recollection any persons present at those meetings were named.

The CHAIRMAN. You did attend the meetings of the highest governing body of the Young Communist League, is that right?

Mr. WECHSLER. Yes; I attended some meetings.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know a man by the name of Max who is the Moscow representative of the Communist Party?

Mr. WECHSLER. If you are asking if a man's name is Max, I knew him and I have so testified to that in a deposition. I regret to say that I do not know his name. We were never told his name, and I am sure you have seen that deposition, and I made the point that he was a character who was not given a name. I don't know how it would have been helpful for me to list a man named Max on this list.

The CHAIRMAN. Was he the Moscow representative of the Communist Party?

Mr. WECHSLER. Senator, I find myself in the embarrassing position of trying to give a lecture on this, but perhaps I was in this before anyone but Mr. Rushmore. In the Young Communist League, Max's role was that of sort of the elder statesman. No one asked questions about him. It was the general impression that he was the representative of the Young Communist International.

Senator SYMINGTON. The question that I wanted to ask you, Mr. Rushmore, was, is it correct what Mr. Wechsler implied, that you have been leaking information from the staff to any newspaper or person in any way?

Mr. RUSHMORE. Senator, when I took this job I had a talk with my editors, including Mr. Hearst.

Senator SYMINGTON. I know Mr. Hearst very well and I have a high opinion of him.

Mr. RUSHMORE. I volunteered this, that I would not write anything in my column including confidential facts before this committee.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is not what Mr. Wechsler said.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute.

Mr. WECHSLER. I was referring to what was known to be the relation of some long standing between Mr. Rushmore and Mr. Winchell.

Mr. COHN. I know Mr. Winchell, too.

Senator SYMINGTON. So do I. I want to put it on the record that I have not leaked anything in this committee to Mr. Winchell either.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that question? I believe you answered the question as to whether Max was the representative of Moscow. Your testimony was that you did not recognize him as the representative to Moscow?

Mr. WECHSLER. There was, if I may continue this lecture, at the moment an organization known as the Young Communist International, and all the Young Communist Leagues were a part of it. It was the general impression of those groups that he had something to do with it. All I can say is that in the somewhat melodramatic world in which we lived that one did not ask his name, and if I may go off the record and inject a humorous note, he believed that every young girl in the Young Communist League ought to submit to him in view of his status.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you say it was off the record?

Mr. WECHSLER. It doesn't matter.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know who Max is as of this time?

Mr. WECHSLER. I have not seen. I guess thought, of Max—I did think of Max once, I wrote a piece which I couldn't get printed in which I tried to do a somewhat whimsical picture of this international figure.

The CHAIRMAN. Your answer is that you do not know him by any other name than Max, and you do not know where he is today?

Mr. WECHSLER. Senator, I said I severed my connection in 1937, and I would scarcely have any knowledge of where or how he is today.

The CHAIRMAN. You say scarcely. I say do you have any knowledge?

Mr. WECHSLER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Now as a member of the national committee would you learn of other important members of the Communist movement through the other membership of the national committee?

Mr. WECHSLER. No; I would have had no access to it, and let me emphasize again that my job was working for the American Student Union. I was director of publications. That was a full-time job, poorly paid, not brilliantly done. In that position my job was primarily to get out a monthly magazine. It was secondarily to make speeches at student union meetings, some of which were not historic speeches.

My attendance at the meetings of the Young Communist League Committee was simply in connection with discussion of policies and work being carried on by the American Student Union. While Mr. Cohn is smiling, I cannot help saying to him that perhaps my knowledge of this history is superior to his.

Mr. COHN. Mr. Wechsler, please do not make conclusions from my facial expressions.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you go to Moscow as a representative of the Young Communist League?

Mr. WECHSLER. Emphatically no, sir. Would you like me to make a statement on that trip?

The CHAIRMAN. After you are through with any answer if you want to add to it, you may. I do not want to try to restrict you on the length of your answers, but if you could answer a few short questions first and elaborate just as much as you care to. Who paid your way on this trip?

Mr. WECHSLER. My wife and I were the leaders of a student group, and we went not merely to Moscow but London, Paris, Vienna, Prague, Warsaw, Stockholm, Helsinki, and home. We were the leaders of that group because I was an official of the student union, and it was the group which was sponsored by the Open Road, which was then a travel agency.

The way in which my wife and I were able to subsidize this trip was that the leaders were picked, I was picked by the student union as the leader, and our fares were paid by a percentage of what each of the 16 or 17 students we led paid for the journey.

The CHAIRMAN. See if I get this straight. You were picked by the student union, and that I believe you testified was a Communist front. Did other members who were not members of the student union pay for your expenses?

Mr. WECHSLER. No, the expenses of my trip were cut out of individual payments made by each person who went on the trip. In other words, if Joe Smith—this is not a significant name—of Harvard College wanted to go on the trip and was lucky enough to have money to go on the trip, he not only paid for the trip, but in that money was money left over to provide for the leaders.

I may say that many parents at that time felt that my wife and I were much too young to lead such a group. This was a tour called Inside Europe.

Senator SYMINGTON. May I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Getting back to the fundamentals, you were a member of the Communist Party or the Young Communist League?

Mr. WECHSLER. League.

Senator SYMINGTON. You thought that was the right thing to be. You were very young, and then you changed, and you became very anti-Communist because you thought it was wrong as a good American?

Mr. WECHSLER. I appreciate the summary, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are those facts?

Mr. WECHSLER. That is right.

Senator SYMINGTON. I want to say that you have been the most forthright witness formerly interested in the Communist Party, or a member of it, that we have had before this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say that perhaps the only reason you say that, Senator, is that you have not been here to hear all of the testimony.

Senator SYMINGTON. I have to answer. If you had told me the day before he came that he was to testify, I would have been here.

Mr. WECHSLER. I want to show that there is no question that you have submitted to me that I have refused to answer to the best of my ability.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wechsler, getting back to the trip to Moscow, I understand it was paid for by the other students who went along. In other words, anyone who qualified would pay his own way and pay a share of your ride.

Mr. WECHSLER. That is correct. This was done through the Open Road, but that was the process of finance.

The CHAIRMAN. The Open Road, was that a Communist-controlled organization?

Mr. WECHSLER. That would be a very difficult question for me to answer, Senator. It was not an organization. It sponsored trips to Europe. The trips were not in my judgment sinister activities.

The CHAIRMAN. Just try to get down to it as close as we can, were the students who went with you on the trip to your knowledge members of the Young Communist League?

Mr. WECHSLER. No. I would have to think carefully about that answer. To my immediate recollection there were no Communists on that trip. The truth of the matter was that the unfortunate basis of the selection for the trip was wealth, that is, those students who were able to afford it. The trip was advertised in the student magazine of which I was editor and as I said, the students who were lucky enough to have the money, made the trip. It was not by political selection because the money had to be obtained.

The CHAIRMAN. You would say that the majority of the students who went along were perhaps not active in any Communist fronts or anything?

Mr. WECHSLER. I would say the dominant group was a nonpolitical student representation, consisting of students who wanted to go to Europe and have fun and a little enlightenment along the way.

The CHAIRMAN. Was this trip made with the approval or upon the suggestion of the Young Communist League?

Mr. WECHSLER. I would not imagine there was any discussion of it. This had been an annual event that had been going on for several years. I was leader of it for 1 year. I am certain it was assumed by the leaders of the Young Communist League that a trip which included Moscow would bring great enlightenment to the members of my group.

May I say in my case and the case of others it was the best thing that could have happened to us because others on the trip, including myself, came back looking for fresh air.

Senator SYMINGTON. What year was this trip made in?

Mr. WECHSLER. It was in the summer of 1937, and it was actually my last performance as a student leader. When I returned from that trip I did not return to any job in the American Student Union because the process of disenchantment was fully under way. If I may again inject a lighter note in this, I was found guilty, for example, of having sent a post card to another member of the Young Communist League which had a picture of Stalin on one side, and I wrote on the other side of the post card, "You see this man's face in all of the latrines here, I wonder who he is." This was not regarded as a mirthful act, and was subject to some criticism when I returned.

Senator SYMINGTON. In 1937, as a result of efforts of the American Government, we were in friendly relationship with the Communists, were we not? The Communist government was recognized by the Government, and it was a mutually friendly relationship.

Mr. WECHSLER. Not only that, but I would say the greatest weapon of the Communists in America was the belief at that time that the collective security against Nazi aggression was the way to prevent the war.

Senator SYMINGTON. That was the days when the Litvinoff theory was prevalent.

Then, in 1939, you were attacking communism, which was before the war started and before Stalin sold out to Hitler. Is that correct?

Mr. WECHSLER. That is correct.

I have with me and I submit for the record an article I wrote, dated September 30, 1939, which I mentioned in my earlier testimony but did not have with me. It was called Stalin and Union Square. It was a discussion of the impact of the Nazi-Soviet pact on the free world.

(The document referred to is marked "Exhibit No. 22," and may be found in the appendix on p. 325.)

Mr. WECHSLER. Subsequent to the publication of that article there appeared, in the October 10, 1939, New Masses, which was the Communist magazine, a rather violent attack on me which I will submit for the record.

(An excerpt from the document referred to is marked "Exhibit No. 23," and will be found in the appendix on p. 329.)

Mr. WECHSLER. I might say from that time on there was never any secret of my relationship with the Communists.

I again find myself in the embarrassing situation here of speaking as an elder here. I was generally regarded as what was called a Red baiter.

Senator SYMINGTON. In other words, before the Soviets sold out to the Nazis you were attacking the Soviet?

Mr. WECHSLER. I was out long before that had happened. I had gone through that period that every former Communist does of breaking with the sentimental associations that existed, which is a different period, but there was no question that I was out.

I have here this reference from the New Masses which I think I ought to read a few paragraphs from into the record. This is in comment on my article, on the article I have just put in the record.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you like to make it available for the record?

Mr. WECHSLER. I would like to do so, but I think it might be useful if I read you one or two excerpts from this to indicate where the situation stood.

The CHAIRMAN. May I suggest, in view of the fact we may be called to vote again, you cut down on what you are reading in the record as much as possible.

Mr. WECHSLER. I am trying to do that. I want to read a couple of sentences.

This is a discussion in the New Masses of the failure of liberals to understand the Nazi-Soviet pact. It includes these sentences:

Finally came the piece de resistance, an article by James Wechsler entitled "Stalin and Union Square" (it has nothing to do with Stalin or union square) in the Nation, of September 30 * * *

Clearly, Mr. Wechsler is a bright young man who has grown a trifle giddy and Gitlowish from the fact that he was once briefly on the inside.

Gitlow is the name of a former Communist who had broken many years earlier and was the Communist symbol of evil people who leave the Communist movement.

It then concludes by saying:

The Wechsler article marks a new low in liberal journalism. That it could have appeared in a magazine like the Nation seems something more than confusion.

The date of this is October 10, 1939. I confess, as I have said earlier in this hearing, that it is something of a nightmare to me to be here today in 1953 defending myself against the insinuation that I did not break with the Communists 15 years ago.

Senator SYMINGTON. My last question would be this:

Is there any reason why it would be to your benefit as an American citizen, and a very successful American citizen, to still be identified covertly or overtly with the Soviet Union?

Mr. WECHSLER. Senator, I regard the Soviet Union as the enemy of everything decent that I believe in in the world. I cannot see what personal profit there could be for me in the extension of the Soviet dictatorship because the paradox of this proceeding is that while I am, I guess, the target in this room, I am perfectly certain that the Communists would dispose of me as quickly as would the chairman of the committee in other situations.

As for personal beliefs and feelings, one's own political autobiography is a long story, but I have tried to summarize it in the statement in today's hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask you one question? Do you consider Stalin as a bloody, immoral dictator?

Mr. WECHSLER. Senator, Stalin is dead, but I believe in his lifetime he achieved that reputation and it was a deserved reputation.

The CHAIRMAN. You feel it was a deserved reputation?

Mr. WECHSLER. I definitely do.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you first discover that communism was not a political party but a conspiracy against the United States?

Mr. WECHSLER. Senator, I have said that I believe that the process of my enlightenment began sharply in the spring of 1937. I have to say here—because I suppose someday I, like everyone else, will write my memoirs—that even while I was in the Young Communist League I had deep anxiety about it. I believed then that the features, the oppressive characteristics of the Young Communist League, were outweighed by other affirmative factors, such as the attempt to help people organize labor unions and similar considerations.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Paul Hagen urge you to leave the party?

Mr. WECHSLER. Yes, Paul Hagen was a very great influence in my life.

The CHAIRMAN. You said he influenced you to break with the party.

Mr. WECHSLER. Yes, sir.

I might say that in this connection with the European trip that one of those whom we saw in the summer of 1937 in Prague was Paul Hagen. He was a refugee from nazism and he was leader of underground anti-Nazi activities.

The CHAIRMAN. How well did you know Hagen?

Mr. WECHSLER. At that time I did not know him very well. I had gotten to know him in the previous year.

The CHAIRMAN. How long did you continue your association with Hagen?

Mr. WECHSLER. There was a lapse of some years when through the accidents of personal life I did not see him. I now see him. He is

now as a matter of fact in private life. He has given up politics. He is a practicing psychiatrist.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he tell you when he had broken with the party?

Mr. WECHSLER. Yes. You see, one of the decisive influences I think in the life of any Communist is the meeting with ex-Communists whom he respects and admires. I believe he had broken in the late twenties and perhaps our personal history somewhat coincided.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me get back to this question of the Moscow trip. You said the trip to Moscow had a lot to do with disillusioning you with respect to communism. Is it not true that that is also the case with many labor leaders and other people in this country, I remember a witness this morning, Miss Freda Utley, who was one of these Communists, and is now testifying against other Communists. She said she was disillusioned when she went to Russia. I happen to know two members of the labor movement—one of whom is a Catholic—both of whom have been shot at by Communists, who told me they were disillusioned when they went to Moscow. So from the standpoint of your trip to Moscow, it might have been a good thing for the United States that you went over there and got the truth.

Mr. WECHSLER. On the basis of my own experience, I would recommend it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Instead of staying home and reading all this dirt that the professional Communists put out about the glories of Russia.

Mr. WECHSLER. I think a free American cannot go to Moscow without sensing even then—and that was a long time ago—the oppressive quality in the air.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that Paul Hagen is the man who got you to leave the party?

Mr. WECHSLER. He was one of the very real influences in my life. He had been a Communist as a young man. When many of us were in the Young Communist League the thing that was denounced most often was the person who left. He was called a traitor. Many people were very sensitive about that. To meet a real live traitor and discover he was an affirmative, decent human being who had not sacrificed his original idealism was a very important thing in my life.

The CHAIRMAN. We both recognize that it is the Communist line to denounce the people who really broke with the party and testified against their former comrades; that the party line is to denounce them as traitors and smear them as much as possible.

Mr. WECHSLER. No question about that. I read similar denunciation of myself.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe that is recognized as the party line. That is one of the reasons why we are curious about the State Department buying your works, because we found that the New York Post has been, I think, the leader—next to the Daily Worker and a few others such as The Compass, which is no longer in existence—the leader in denouncing very viciously and intemperately without regard to the truth at all, I think without exception, every man who has ever broken with the Communist Party and appeared as a witness against spies and traitors. I believe the Post may have, with one exception. Your testimony was that you did not make such attacks on Chambers. I have not searched the papers to find out whether you did or not. I would like to ask you this question, Mr. Wechsler:

You say you broke with the party; you went to Moscow, you came back, and you said you broke. Did the tone of your writings change at that time? Did you then find any anti—that is, former Communists who were testifying against Communists in whom you could find some good counter to what the Young Communist League preached? Was there any overt act that would convince anybody reading your books, looking for something to put in the Voice of America, to show that you had changed?

Mr. WECHSLER. I suggest that my articles on the Hiss case, which I intend to introduce as exhibits, would answer that question.

As I said, and I find I am forced to repeat myself, I do not believe that the fact that a man is an ex-Communist makes him particularly virtuous or particularly evil. I believe from the moment he leaves the Communist movement it is his responsibility to create an affirmative existence and demonstrate a genuine dedication to democracy.

That goes beyond the question of whether he writes particular anti-Communist articles. That is one thing that I have done and others have done.

The CHAIRMAN. It is easy to write anti-Communist articles. The easiest thing in the world to get up and say "Communism is bad." The hard thing is to do a thing like Budenz: get up and testify against your former comrades to see that they are deported or sent to jail.

In the book of the Young Communist Leaders you say that man is a traitor. In your book he is still a traitor according to your writing.

Mr. WECHSLER. Senator, that is not a true statement. I have never made such a comment on Louis Budenz.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you not been attacking Budenz?

Mr. WECHSLER. I believe I had a very strenuous debate with him on television about his book. I thought his book was terrible. I do not believe the fact that he was the managing editor of the Daily Worker means that his book has to be praised.

Let me add on the same point—

The CHAIRMAN. Have you not been attacking Budenz rather constantly whenever he testifies? I perhaps should not have used the word "traitor." I do not know whether you called him a traitor, but you certainly have been viciously attacking him.

Mr. WECHSLER. That is not a true statement. I believe I criticized Budenz with respect to the case in which Joe Alsop testified very vigorously against Budenz. Joe testified as a man who had been in China and he gave—I believe this was the Vincent case—Joe gave what appeared to be clearly personal firsthand testimony in refutation of statements made by Budenz. I do not believe that an ex-Communist deserves any particular reverence simply because he is an ex-Communist when he takes positions—

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wechsler, you have just said that the Communist line was to, I believe, preach that every man who broke with the Communist Party was a "traitor," or something along that line, and there was no good in any man that broke with the party. We find that you, whose books are being used to fight communism, still follow that same theory apparently. If not, will you tell us what former member of the party, who has come up and testified against his former comrades, you have ever found any good in?

MR. WECHSLER. I have mentioned Whitaker Chambers, who is perhaps the most celebrated witness.

THE CHAIRMAN. Do you have an article in which you praised Chambers?

MR. WECHSLER. Yes; I have an article in which I believe I warmly challenged the suggestion—

THE CHAIRMAN. I would like to have that article in which you praised Chambers.

MR. WECHSLER. I am sorry to have so many documents with me. This is the result of a prolific existence.

THE CHAIRMAN. Do you want your counsel to look for that while we ask you another question?

MR. WECHSLER. Go ahead. Here it is; The Progressive of February 1949.

(The document referred to is marked "Exhibit No. 24" and will be found in the appendix on p. 330.)

THE CHAIRMAN. You have objected strenuously to your being called. Let me ask you this: If you were not a newspaperman and you were a lawyer or banker, and if your books were discovered in the Information Program libraries and if we found that you were so high in the Communist movement, in the national committee of the Young Communist League, if we found that you claimed to have broken with the Communist Party in 1937 but since then have been quite consistently attacking anyone who hurts individual Communists—

MR. WECHSLER. Senator. I must dissent as you make that statement.

THE CHAIRMAN. Let me finish the question. [Continues:] And waging a rather constant attack on the various chairmen and members of the House Un-American Activities Committee, would you think it was improper to call you, if you were not a newspaperman?

MR. WECHSLER. You are asking me for comment on the scope of this inquiry. I think, first of all, I would take the editorial position that I believe there are more sinister problems to deal with than the books that may be on the shelves overseas. But let me add even more emphatically that I have not been told which book of mine it was that has been found.

THE CHAIRMAN. Yes; you have. You offered one chapter in the record. That was from one of the books. We have told you very clearly that we do not have the record of the number of your books and which of your books are on the shelves. We are now attempting to find out whether the two books which you wrote, which I believe you said followed the Communist Party line while you were a member of the Young Communist League, were on the shelves.

The question is this:

If you were not a newspaperman, do you think we would have a right to call you as an author whose works are being used in the information program, knowing that you had been as high in the Communist movement as you have been? Would you think then we would have a right to call you? Does the fact that you are a newspaperman, you think, give you some special privilege?

MR. WECHSLER. Senator, I believe that the question of whether a man is called obviously would depend for one thing on the content of the book. At this late date in this proceeding you acknowledged to

me that your staff, after a trip to Europe, is unable to tell me what books were found there.

The CHAIRMAN. We know that some of your books are on the shelves. We do not know how many.

Senator SYMINGTON. They have not been able to tell you what books are on the shelves?

Mr. WECHSLER. No, sir. At the last hearing I presented for the record a book called Labor Baron which is an autobiography of John L. Lewis. It is that book that I believe Senator McCarthy said had been found in the library overseas. That book includes a lengthy chapter discussing Communist infiltration in the labor movement and exposing it.

The CHAIRMAN. We have told Mr. Wechsler that the State Department has informed us that his book Labor Baron is definitely on the shelf. They have told us at this point they are making a search to inform us how many of his other books are on the shelf.

Now, you will answer this question. The question is:

Do you feel that we would have a right to call you if you were not a newspaperman, knowing that your books are being used, knowing that you were so high in the Communist movement you were in the national committee of the Young Communist League? If you were not a newspaperman, would you say that we would have a right to call you?

Mr. WECHSLER. I have said, Senator, that I do not regard the inquiry as a useful one. I repeat, however, that with respect to myself, there is a background of this proceeding which is a matter of record and that since the only book you are able to describe at this late date as authoritatively having been found abroad is an anti-Communist book I wrote, a book which was denounced in all reviews by the Daily Worker, that I regard the proceeding as an absurdity.

Mr. COHN. I think the record ought to be clear on this.

The Author's Index indicates Mr. Wechsler's books are in use. That is for certain. Exactly which of them, it is a practical impossibility at this point to know.

Mr. WECHSLER. But that is a rather crucial question, Mr. Cohn. Two of the books I wrote when I was an anti-Communist.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think you are being persecuted by this committee?

Mr. WECHSLER. I believe the object of this proceeding was, as I stated, a reprisal against the Post for its fight against the chairman of this committee. I believe I would not be here if I were not the editor of the Post and I did not engage in such a fight.

Senator SYMINGTON. This point is very important to me because I am trying to find out what I think about this matter.

You said you did not want to file this list because other people who were leading normal lives, that had left the Communist Party and not done what a lot of people had done, turned in people who are in it, would be destroyed, is that correct, or might be destroyed?

Mr. WECHSLER. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. If that is true, then every one of those people might be exactly in the same position you are in, based on the questions that are being asked you, might they not?

Mr. WECHSLER. That is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. They might be considered as still members of the Communist Party because they could not prove that they had gone out actively and worked against the Communist Party, regardless of whether they were still Communists or not Communists. Is that right?

Mr. WECHSLER. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you feel, Mr. Wechsler, that it is your status as a newspaperman which gives you some special immunity or do you feel we have the same right to call newsmen as we have the same right to call newsmen as we have lawyers and doctors?

Mr. WECHSLER. I ask no special immunity. I say only that I believe I am here because I am a newspaperman and because of what I have done as a newspaperman.

The CHAIRMAN. You would say if you were not a newspaperman, if you had this record of being so high in the Communist Party, if the State Department informed us that your books were being used, would you say then that we would have the same right to call you as any other witness?

I ask you that because you have been shouting that this is interfering with freedom of the press. It puts me in mind of so many people screaming that their right to scream has been denied. I have not found that your right to scream has been denied you at all. I have not found that your right to distort and twist the news has been interfered with since you have been here. I may say again, just so you need not go out and say McCarthy intimated that Wechsler is still a member of the party or McCarthy insinuated you were valuable to the Communist movement, I may say that your purported reformation does not convince me at all. I know if I were head of the Communist Party and I had Jim Wechsler come to Moscow and I discovered this bright man, apparently a good writer, I would say, "Mr. Wechsler, when you go back to the United States, you will state that you are breaking with the Communist Party, you will make general attacks against communism, and then you will be our ring leader in trying to attack and destroy any man who tries to hurt and dig out the specific traitors who are hurting our country."

You have followed that pattern. I say this so you need not say that McCarthy intimated or insinuated. You have followed that pattern consistently of being of tremendous value to the party in always spearheading the attack upon every individual in the United States who exposes individual Communists as against shouting about communism generally.

I may say that when we called you, a writer whose books are being used, paid for by the taxpayers, and ask you to give an account of your activities, that the mere fact that you happen to have an interest in the paper does not grant you any immunity; that unless this committee vetoes it, I am going to take the position that there is no exempt profession or class of people insofar as this committee is concerned.

Now, I assume you will want to comment perhaps at some length on what I have just said.

Mr. WECHSLER. Senator, first let me say that I have taken the position that this is an issue that I believe the American Society of Newspaper Editors should weigh on the basis of the transcript we have conducted here.

(A short recess was taken.)

The CHAIRMAN. Shall we go back on the record, Mr. Wechsler?

Mr. Wechsler, I do not believe there was any pending question. I had made a comment, and I thought Mr. Wechsler would have something to say about that. Beyond that, I have no further questions.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I came in late, owing to the votes over on the floor on tidelands oil.

As I recall, when Mr. Wechsler was here before I asked that he submit for the record articles and statements by him from the time he left the Young Communist League in the fall of 1937 which was after he returned from Europe.

Mr. WECHSLER. I submitted what I regarded as the basic exhibit mentioned in the earlier hearing which was the article I wrote in the Nation at the time of the Nazi-Soviet pact and the New Masses' attack on me that was published at that time.

Senator JACKSON. The article in the Nation was in 1939?

Mr. WECHSLER. That is right, sir. That was in the period of the pact.

May I say that the New Masses' attack on me which was published then refers to me rather sharply as a young man who had been a Communist briefly and who is now a sinister anti-Communist.

Senator, I think we are at the heart of the matter. As I understand it, you have repeated the view that in a rather elaborate and complicated world the attacks on me which have appeared in Communist publications, the anti-Communist articles which I have written, are merely conclusive proof that in some way I am a secret Communist operator.

Now, as I have said and written, when I get to this point, it is difficult for me to keep contact with the real world. Let me put it this way: It is true that I believe, and you know I believe this, that you have done in my judgment serious damage to the battle against communism by confusing liberals with Communists. Suppose I have gone on to say you have an ex-Communist on your staff and this is clear proof that you are the front for a sinister operation designed to confuse, divide, and create bitterness in America—now, I say this, I do not state this to be a fact, as you have stated the alternative to be a fact, I state it only to indicate the nightmare world we are walking in when I come in here with an exhibit, for example, from the Daily Worker which I would like to put in the record, headlined, "Wechsler's Lies Can't Halt Struggle for Peace."

This is a long essay by one Joseph Clark, dated June 19, 1950, in connection with the Post position on the Korean war.

Senator SYMINGTON. What magazine?

Mr. WECHSLER. This is in the Daily Worker. I have the Daily Worker of April 12, 1950, headlined, "The Frightened Child Who Edits the New York Post." Even as late as 1950 I was being called a child. That too is a lengthy denunciation of me in connection with the support of America's foreign policy in resisting Communist aggression.

(The two documents referred to, marked "Exhibits Nos. 25 and 26," will be found in the appendix on pp. 334 and 335.)

Mr. WECHSLER. I have many other things here which I am going to submit in the record. I see no point in my reiterating at great length quotations from the exhibits.

The CHAIRMAN. Some of the matters you consider have sufficient importance we would like to have reproduced in the record as such, especially if you are referring this to the ASNE. Other items should be received only as exhibits.

It is now 5:30. I assume you will want to spend some time on that. I hesitate taking up the time of Senator Jackson and Senator Symington while we go over each exhibit.

Mr. WECHSLER. That was my understanding I would not. I have just indicated I assume that Mr. Cohn and I will go over the record and that we will then determine which documents are to be published as exhibits.

Senator JACKSON. And which will be included in the record?

Mr. WECHSLER. Which will be included in the record, if that is agreeable.

Mr. COHN. We have a very important public hearing tomorrow which will run all morning long.

Senator SYMINGTON. How long will you be in town?

Mr. WECHSLER. Just as short as possible. I am still editor of a newspaper, which is my profession. I would like to go back to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this, Mr. Wechsler:

As we have stated before, we have a very tight budget. I do not want to put unnecessary material in the record. I think every exhibit which you want to have brought to the attention of the press should be brought to their attention. However, if you merely attach the exhibits as exhibits, some of the members of the press will not see them at all. If you could get sufficient copies, there are a number of places here that do very speedy and excellent jobs of photostating.

Senator SYMINGTON. The chairman has always made a point of the fact that it is important people who have been interested previously in the Communist situation show that they have changed. In your interest, I suggest that you put as much in the record as you think should be in the record. I was very much impressed with some of the things you read showing your anti-Communist positions. So even though it is expensive, I think that you ought to take great care to make this record as clear from your standpoint as you believe it should be. I would add to that, as clear as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. I might say in that connection—I know you do not need my advice—but might I suggest that when you are making this record, putting in the general condemnation against the Communist Party, that is very easy to do all through the country, it is popular for political support, you wave your arms and damn communism generally. It is perfectly safe, it does not hurt the Communist movement. I would suggest that if during that 15-year period you have ever taken an active part in exposing, obtaining the conviction or deportation of an individual Communist, that would be very, very strong evidence that my evaluation of your activities is wrong.

If you merely place in the record general statements against communism, any logical person I believe, would assume that regardless of whether you have broken or not that would be the sort of thing you would do.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would have to take exception, Mr. Chairman, on that.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say, Mr. Symington, this is something I have had quite a long postgraduate course in and I have found the most rabid supporters of the Communist movement, the ones that do the most good for them, are not the well-known Communists. Take Gates of the Daily Worker, he can do very little good for the Communist Party except act as a telegraph agency. The only Communists that are of any benefit to the party are under-cover Communists who from time to time must damn communism generally.

You find them damning communism generally in one breath and in the next breath they damn everyone who is hurting the Communist movement.

I do think Mr. Wechsler, over the 15-year period of time, if this break has been as genuine as he believes it is and as you may believe it is—I do not know—it would be a lot of value to him if he could show where he was active in helping to dig out specific individual Communists.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I would disagree with you on the statement about the deportation illustration. The only thing I can go by—I cannot look into a man's brain—is whether his behavior is inconsistent with the policies and programs of the Communist Party. If I understand this record correctly, Mr. Wechsler left the Communist Party in the fall of 1937.

MR. WECHSLER. The Young Communist League.

Senator JACKSON. The Young Communist League at the age of 21 or 22.

Senator SYMINGTON. Fall of 1939.

MR. WECHSLER. No; left in December of 1937.

Senator JACKSON. All that any of us can do, looking at these things objectively, is to look at a man's behavior after he states that he left the Young Communist League or other Communist organization. If my interpretation of the record is correct in this case, Mr. Wechsler has taken a stand publicly contrary to the aims and views of the Communist Party on every major turn of the party line. Is that a fair statement?

MR. WECHSLER. That is correct.

Let me interpolate that if the Communist Party is for more public housing, I am not going to be against it. I think in the realm of foreign policy, where the issues have been clearly drawn, I have taken positions that are unequivocally hostile to Communists throughout this period.

Senator JACKSON. I understand you have never indicated an unwillingness to cooperate with Government agencies when you have been approached by such agencies with reference to your past connections with the Young Communist League or during that period of 1934 to 1937; is that correct?

MR. WECHSLER. That is correct.

Senator JACKSON. As I understand it, you made a voluntary statement back in 1948 to Mr. Nichols, of the FBI.

MR. WECHSLER. That is correct.

Senator JACKSON. Giving him at that time all the information you had.

MR. WECHSLER. That is, all the information he requested. I want to make clear that he did not at that time ask me for a list of these

dimensions. I believe he did not because the nature of the list seems to me to be absurd.

Senator JACKSON. I do not know just what a person should do in a case like this to more clearly indicate his position as compared with his earlier position when he was a member of the Young Communist League. I just wonder what a person is supposed to do in a case like this above and beyond what the record discloses here.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator, you brought up this problem, that Mr. Wechsler was a member of the Communist League when he was a youth. He got wise to the fact, especially after he went to Moscow and he left the party and he has been denouncing it in general ever since over a period of years.

In addition to that, he has been very successful under our system. Do you not agree with me that it would be inconceivable he would want to have any relationship with this evil which is now menacing America, the Soviet Government?

Senator JACKSON. His whole behavior has been inconsistent since he left the Young Communist League with anything that would be in line with the Communist program.

The CHAIRMAN. What is this?

Senator JACKSON. He said his behavior since he left the Young Communist League.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you been reading his paper?

Senator JACKSON. What paper?

The CHAIRMAN. The Post.

Senator JACKSON. Sure I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you not aware of the fact that Wechsler has been the ringleader in trying to assassinate the character of anyone who deserts the party and testifies against his former comrades? It is all right in Wechsler's philosophy to allegedly desert the party and do nothing about it. He has been the chief ringleader in smearing the head of every Un-American Activities Committee. There has been no change in his writings since he admits he was active in the Communist movement as far as I can see. And then and now Mr. Wechsler does from time to time cuss out communism generally, the easiest, the safest thing in the world to do.

If, as I said before, if I were a member of the Communist Party and if I were the bright newspaperman that Mr. Wechsler apparently is, if I wanted to aid the Communist Party, I would not stay above-ground and say I was a member of the Communist Party, I would say I deserted the Communist Party and then I would do exactly as Mr. Wechsler has been doing.

Mr. WECHSLER. Senator, you said it was my turn, remember?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. WECHSLER. I wonder if I could address myself to that.

The CHAIRMAN. While you are doing that, I wish you would explain with the article you are putting in the record how you would get rid of the Communists in Government in that you attack the House Un-American Activities Committee, you attack what you call the stool pigeons who give the information; as I recall, you called the FBI political G-men; you attacked what you called guilt by association. I cannot conceive of that being opposed to the Communist movement. It just seems to be exactly what you or I would do if we

were still in complete sympathy with the movement. That is why I correct Mr. Jackson because he was not here during all this testimony. I think he should know about all this.

Senator SYMINGTON. I was here during the testimony. First, I want to say that nobody believes more in the FBI than I do and I am sorry if Mr. Wechsler has criticized the FBI.

The CHAIRMAN. Not only criticized, Senator, they have been almost a constant target for Mr. Wechsler.

Mr. WECHSLER. Senator, that is not a true statement.

Senator SYMINGTON. Based on the way the chairman looks at it—and I cannot agree with him about it—if you have not denounced all the Communists around you, then you are automatically not really leaving the party. You might carry it a little further and say that the cleverest thing of all would be to do all those things which people would not suspect that you would do, in order to get in with the other crowd, and yet maintain your position in the Communist Party.

The question, for example, which I thought your position was very broad on, Mr. Chairman, was whether or not we should release these names because we might hurt innocent people. That means there are people who have been members of the Communist Party, possibly on this list who have not told they were members, or have not told on other people they knew were members. I do not think it is fair for us to indict those people because, although they decided to change, they did not tell on others; any more than we would indict people, who, for remunerative reward, or any other reason, decided to tell on people to clear their position. In my opinion, and I have studied communism a little, those people who made a complete turn, might be doing the very thing which would make it possible for them to stay in the Communist Party and yet have everybody believe they were out of it.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say in regard to this list of names, at this point I see no particular reason to make public any names like Jack Stachel, Earl Browder. As far as I can see, there may be a few names I do not recognize here, but most of them have been exposed as having been active in the Communist Party over a long period of time. It would neither hurt them nor do them any good to have it again stated that they were Communists.

Senator SYMINGTON. What you have done then in this list, as I asked you before, is to put down everybody you are sure was a Communist when you were in the Young Communist League?

Mr. WECHSLER. Yes. Let me add if this were a list of known Communists, the effort and struggle of conscience involved in assembling such a list over such a long period would not have occurred. It is because it covered so distant a period and so many people whose present political attitudes are unknown and who have disappeared from the horizon, that the preparation of this list was a source of tremendous concern to me and my anxiety about its not being placed in the record is so great.

Obviously, if I prepared a list of people who were known Communists today, it would not be a subject of any concern to me to have their names made public.

Senator McCARTHY. I might say, Mr. Wechsler, as far as I am concerned, I can see nothing to be gained at this time by making this

list public. You may have some on here who have not been publicly exposed as to Communist activities, Donald Henderson, Earl Browder, Jack Stachel.

Mr. WECHSLER. Senator, you asked for a list of all those I knew. I included those who are still known to be Communists.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you have any objection to putting those names in?

Mr. WECHSLER. Take the case of Earl Browder, I am sure the staff will agree whatever his present status is, he is out of the Communist Party.

Mr. COHN. Do you think that is a fact?

Mr. WECHSLER. I think pending further investigation it is a fact.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think Browder has broken with the Communist movement?

Mr. WECHSLER. Senator, I have great compassion in discussing the present political positions of those who have broken because I know that sometimes the process is difficult. I am sure any ex-Communist will testify to that. I can not give you any personal testimony of Mr. Browder's personal position beyond what has appeared in the press.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think the committee might be making a point. Do you want to leave it on the record that you think Mr. Browder is an ex-Communist?

Mr. WECHSLER. No, I am citing an example of a man who has publicly stated that he has, and I am not in a position to dispute it.

Senator SYMINGTON. I recommend that we strike that from the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think we should. If he thinks Browder has broken with the party, I think that casts some light on his line of thinking.

Mr. WECHSLER. I said, sir, I believe there is surface evidence. I have not investigated. Mr. Browder has in recent months taken very strong public positions in the denunciation of the Communist Party. You seem to interpret such positions as ipso facto proof that the man is still a Communist. I suggest that he at least warrants further inquiry before such a judgment is made.

Senator JACKSON. You are talking about a former member of the Communist Party.

Mr. WECHSLER. I am not arguing that Mr. Browder today is the hope of the Western World.

May I refer to the Harpers article for a moment, which you have characterized as fierce denunciation of the FBI.

Senator JACKSON. Would you comment on the colloquy between the chairman and myself after I made a statement about the writings?

Mr. WECHSLER. Yes. I thought I would mention this and I think I am going to be allowed to make a final summary in answer to the statement made by the chairman before you arrived.

In the Harpers article I described the operations of the wartime-loyalty program. I said among other things:

The FBI, military and naval intelligence and other groups staged similar inquiries. There were absurdities and wrongs committed, as anybody who inhabited wartime Washington knows. Yet, in perspective, it may appear most significant that we waged the most far flung war in our history without re-

sembling a police state, that the sporadic "terror" was more foolish than fierce, and that our liberties survived the war without major scars.

Further on in the same article in which I was discussing the problems involved in the loyalty program procedure, I said:

Both Attorney General Clark and J. Edgar Hoover have manifested visible concern over liberal criticisms leveled against the terms of the program. While some conscientious detractors have hinted that this concern is "purely political," it is slightly gratuitous to complain when men in high office view liberal policies as sound politics.

Since I regard myself as a liberal, I regard that as a partial compliment. I should like to say, however, that we could go back and forth over these documents all afternoon and for many more afternoons. It seems to me perfectly plain that the premise of the chairman of the committee—he has stated it when he asked you, Senator Jackson, whether you read my newspaper—is that the editorial policies of the Post are proof of his allegations as to my sinister political quality. I can only say that the chairman also suggested—I believe the transcript will bear me out—in our earlier meeting that he did not read my sheet. I find in that something of a contradiction. I am, therefore, forced to briefly summarize certain key issues, issues in the World which seem to me to be decisive on which the New York Post took a clear stand. I do this because these questions have been raised and although as you know I have challenged the propriety of inquiry as to a newspaper's editorial policy, I shall not let the record go uncontested.

Others have been convinced of my loyalty by my editorials. I should like to offer as an exhibit a copy of the article from Harper's magazine, November 1947, entitled "How To Rid the Government of Communists." I should also like to offer an editorial from the Labor Leader, a publication of the Association of Catholic Trade Unions, of August 25, 1952, entitled "Unforgivable Sin."

(The documents referred to above were marked "Exhibits Nos. 27 and 28," and will be found in the appendix on pp. 336 and 341.)

Mr. WECHSLER. I believe, as I said in my first appearance here, that perhaps the most crucial test of American liberalism in recent years was the attempt of the Communists to run Henry Wallace for President in 1948 and to capture control of the liberal movement. I think this was very serious because it was the high-water mark of Communist activity in America. I want to say that then as a journalist I believe I was one of the most active in exposing the Communist manipulation of that movement. In numerous articles I made the point that the Communists had taken over this operation and that it was a serious threat. I should like to believe that I may even have had some small impact on the ultimate failure of that movement.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is the Wallace-Taylor movement?

Mr. WECHSLER. In 1948; yes. I wrote in the Progressive magazine:

When the full story is written, it will document the machinations of Communists who lead them on with false flattery and promises of hidden strength. It will speculate on the might have been's if Wallace had remained in the political party. There are several plausible explanations for Wallace's weird observations on the manners and morals of world Communists. The most obvious is that he could not risk an open collision with the Communists without wrecking the basis of operations on which his campaign was being waged.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wechsler, I now have this article from which you are quoting.

Mr. WECHSLER. Do you mind if I finish this passage?

That as he gradually perceived the truth about the sponsorship of his drive, he had to fashion repeated assurances for himself as well as for his non-Communist followers. The check cue was primarily a symptom of a peculiar ghastly problem of Russian war against the Marshall plan. It was on this issue as well as on the others that Wallace lost the faith of many of his devoted liberal adherents.

I described at length the efforts of the operations of the Communists in the movement, the relationship of it to Russian policy, and so forth. Here is another article from the Progressive of September 1948, entitled "The Philadelphia Payoff."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 29" and will be found in the appendix on p. 342.)

The CHAIRMAN. Before you go to the next article, I would like to read some other passages from the article from which you have just read.

It is entitled, "How to Rid the Government of Communists," by James A. Wechsler.

Do you know the date of this, Mr. Wechsler?

Mr. WECHSLER. I believe it is August 1947.

The CHAIRMAN. Just let me read you 1 or 2 passages.

On page 441 of the article you referred to the—

Notoriously unreliable files compiled by the peerless peephole artists of the House Un-American Activities Committee.

I find on the same page:

Since stool pigeons are the key figures in most investigative cases.

Mr. WECHSLER. That is a reference to the general legal fact.

The CHAIRMAN (reading):

Since stool pigeons are the key figures in most investigative cases, this explanation can't be glibly thrown out of court.

You talk about "admittedly this makes life tougher for the political G-men." Are you talking about the FBI?

Mr. WECHSLER. Obviously political G-men are allusions to politicians who are playing this game.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you talking about the FBI there?

Mr. WECHSLER. To the best of my recollection it is not the FBI.

The CHAIRMAN. You are talking about some board. You recommend:

This board must be empowered in cases that it holds doubtful and inconclusive, to require the FBI to produce the full details of its findings and the witnesses from whom it was obtained. Admittedly this may make life tougher for the political G-men.

Would that refresh your recollection? Do you know if you were referring to the FBI or not?

Mr. WECHSLER. Sorry, I cannot give you my subjective thoughts.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say I have completed my examination of you.

Do you find in this article the same thing we have found all through your writings, the villains are those, the stool pigeons, the political G-men, the people on the House Un-American Activities Committee. The villains are the men who expose and bring to justice the Communists.

Now, you have a perfect right, certainly to believe that and to write that as much as you want to. However, that is why you are before the committee, that type of writing has been used by the information program and libraries, I do not know how many, throughout the world, and you are here to give the committee, if you could, proof that your writings have changed, that you are now the type of anti-Communist whose books the taxpayers might want to purchase, I should say that most of the taxpayers might want to purchase to fight communism.

You may put anything else that you want to in the record. As Senator Symington, he and some other Senators have an important meeting, if you do not finish tonight you may come back tomorrow.

Mr. WECHSLER. I will try to do this in less than 5 minutes.

You have concluded your remarks again by referring to books that I wrote. I again say that although this is the second time I have been here, it has not been indicated which books I wrote were found on the shelves overseas.

The CHAIRMAN. I have to interrupt you there. You have repeated that three times. We have told you now we have asked the State Department for a list of your books. We cannot search the libraries. They say you are one of the authors whose works they have purchased. They have located some of your books, the one you wrote about John L. Lewis. They say they are making a search to tell us how many of your books are being used. We have just to wait until they give us that report. The point is that you were one of the authors that they purchased from.

Mr. WECHSLER. I understand that. I will repeat that I will insert in the record the chapter from the John L. Lewis book discussing the destructive operations of Communists inside the CIO. Let me say, as I conclude, I think I have indicated to you the nature of the fantasy in which I find myself. I do not claim that all the acts of my life have been acts of superior and unquestioned wisdom. I do assert on the basis of a record and a public record and a record of activity that I have nothing to hide and that I yield to no one on the issue of fighting communism in the manner that I believe to be the effective way of fighting it.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you like to tell us any Communists that you have fought who have not been previously exposed?

Mr. WECHSLER. Senator, I have tried to indicate to you just a moment ago that in all my coverage of the Wallace movement, which was in my judgment the most serious threat in recent years of Communist strength in America, I was continually exposing it as a Communist operation.

Now, I say that with some emphasis because that, if I may say so, Senator, is before you had undertaken this crusade.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you think there was danger of the Wallace Party winning the election, or did you think that there was danger of the Wallace party taking enough votes so that the old Acheson crowd would be kicked out and exposed?

Mr. WECHSLER. I thought there was very grave danger of the Wallace party getting enough votes so that the world would be confused as to the nature and solemnity of American resistance to Communist aggression, because it was Mr. Wallace's position at that time that there was no real threat from the Russians.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Wechsler, let us be a bit frank here, if I may. You are talking of this as a shining example of your fight against communism. Is it not the truth that you knew that the Wallace party had no possible chance of winning that election, but that you were afraid if they picked up enough of the votes of the type that you appealed to, the leftwingers, the party liners, that perhaps it would mean a defeat and an exposure of the old Acheson crowd that had been so thoroughly infiltrated by Communists?

Mr. WECHSLER. Senator, the Communists up and down the line were supporting Wallace. If you are accusing me of a subjective conspiracy to elect a Democratic President, we have certainly widened the scope of this inquiry and that perhaps affects other Senators on this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. We are not talking about a Democrat or Republican. But when you get up and tell us that your attack upon Wallace proves how anti-Communist you are, that does not ring too true there.

Mr. WECHSLER. Senator, it is clear to me that nothing that I say will be acknowledged by you to be a valid point. I have been guilty, as I freely acknowledge, of criticizing you pretty hard. I stand by that criticism.

The CHAIRMAN. I have not questioned you about that criticism.

Mr. WECHSLER. You have referred numerous times to my criticism of the committee. I think it is your basic belief that the only test of patriotism as I said before is the attitude of a newspaper editor toward the operations of your committee in this field. I cannot and do not meet that test and do not propose, if I may say so, to try to meet it.

The CHAIRMAN. As I have said before, Mr. Wechsler, if the New York Post or Jim Wechsler started to praise McCarthy when I exposed Communists, I would be certain that I was hanging an innocent man.

Mr. WECHSLER. Senator, I think that the danger of praise of your activities appearing in a prominent place in the New York Post is one that should not keep you awake at night.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. WECHSLER. Let me say on the issue of the New York Post, as it has been referred to so often, that the New York Post under my editorship supported the Marshall plan which was bitterly fought by the Communists all over the world. We supported the Truman doctrine of resistance to communism. We supported the stand taken against aggression in Korea. Here's an editorial on that from the Post of June 28, 1950.

(The editorial referred to is marked "Exhibit No. 30" and will be found in the appendix on p. 345.)

Mr. WECHSLER. We have continuously taken the view that it is only through the collective and united strength of the free world that we can escape the terrible shadow of Soviet aggression.

These are all matters of the record, and so at the end as at the beginning, I find myself attempting to say to you that these are policies so clear, positions so indisputable that I know of no other way in which I could offer what might be regarded here as conclusive proof.

I want to say in all earnestness that I regard this as a very serious thing not merely because of what I consider to be the press issue, but because I have been known as an anti-Communist for many years. I

say to you this proceeding against me is going to make it less likely that some young kids somewhere will break with communism. If I can be brought before this proceeding 15 years after and subjected to this brain washing, all I can say is that there are going to be a lot of people who are going to say "How do you possibly win back a place in decent democratic society?"

The CHAIRMAN. You refer to brain washing, you feel that the questions that have been asked you are unfair, that you have been browbeaten?

Mr. WECHSLER. I have said many times in the hearing, Senator, that I believe I am here because of our editorial policy.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you feel that the questions are unfair, that you have been browbeaten?

Mr. WECHSLER. I think that many of your comments, if I may say so with careful understatement, about me have been outrageous. With respect to the questions you have asked me, this has been a fascinating experience in some respects.

The CHAIRMAN. Very honestly, I would like to know, do you think we have asked you any unfair questions? Let us assume for the time being you were not a newspaperman, that you were a lawyer or something else, would you then say the questions we have asked you are unfair?

Mr. WECHSLER. I think the basic unfairness in that realm of this proceeding is that you are repeatedly asking me to furnish proof that I have praised the operations of such Senate committees as this. I submit to you that is not a test.

The CHAIRMAN. We never asked you about your criticism of this committee. I may say that I have no concern whatsoever of your criticism of me or of this committee. The reason we asked you about your constant opposition to any committee that was exposing Communists was in line with our checking on all of the authors who have been purchased by the American taxpayers in this alleged fight against communism.

I would like to get back to this, Do you think our questions to you have been unfair?

Mr. WECHSLER. I said, and you force me to repeat myself, that the line of the inquiry has in my judgment been directed at a newspaper because of its policies and much of it has been far beyond any possible relevance to a man's political position.

The CHAIRMAN. If you are a lawyer, Mr. Wechsler, and we asked you about alleged or purported Communist activities as a lawyer, not as a newspaperman, over the past 10 years, would you think that we were unfair?

Mr. WECHSLER. Senator, I could not answer that without knowing the circumstances under which a man was called, the basis for the summons. I point out again that I was called here on very brief notice before you even were able to produce the books or the records of the books that you found overseas. I do not know what the reason for this haste was, but I say that the whole nature of the proceeding has clearly been unrelated to any condition of immediate emergency. I think I am here for one reason only, and that is because of the fights we have put up for civil liberties in the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wechsler, you asked about the haste. I may tell you that we are trying to finish our investigation of the informa-

tion program in time to report to the Appropriations Committee. It is unfortunate that the State Department could not tell us just which of your books are being used, or where. We know you are being listed as an author.

As a final comment, may I say I think you are doing tremendous damage to the newspaper profession when you try to claim a privilege which no other witness with the Communist background has claimed except a couple of professors. You take the position that because you are a newspaperman you are in some special category that cannot be examined. It is like I believe, as Walter Winchell said the other day, it seems according to you to be perfectly all right for a newspaper to criticize anyone on earth, but when they turn around and criticize a newsman, then that is abusing freedom of the press.

I do not think our newsmen as a whole are so weakened or so cowardly that they need fear the investigation or exposure of some of the members of the profession.

I was a lawyer, I used to be very happy when the law would catch up with a crooked lawyer and send him to jail. I think bankers as a whole applaud when a crooked banker is caught and sent to jail. They do not want him disgracing their profession.

I am not saying at this point that you are or are not a disgrace to the newspaper profession, but you apparently take the position that no matter how much a disgrace a man is to the newspaper profession he must not be called and exposed, because if he is exposed it is endangering freedom of the press. I do think in taking that position you are doing, I believe I said, a great deal of damage. Maybe I am overestimating it—I do not believe you are important in the newspaper world to do a lot of damage. I believe you are doing some damage, you are creating the impression in some minds that the newspaper profession is afraid to have their members exposed when they are guilty of improper conduct.

Mr. WECHSLER. I believe I responded to that issue before, and when I said I will leave that to the Society of American Newspaper Editors to judge when the transcript is made public.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say your threat to submit this to the American Society of Newspaper Editors has no effect on me whatsoever. I do not care what you submit to them. You can submit whatever you care to.

Mr. WECHSLER. It is my hope it will have an effect on public opinion in America. That is my objective. Let me say in closing that I have freely answered all questions submitted to me. I might say, Senator, as we have said so often in editorials, that sometimes it might be argued that you ought to follow my precedent in connection with another committee, if you will permit me that final comment. I stand on my record as an editor, as an American, and I repeat again my conviction that I would not be here before you if I had been able to find a more affirmative view of your role in America. I think I have now reached the point where redundancy becomes repetition, and I think I will desist.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know how soon we can get the record to the newsmen. I understand Mr. Wechsler is agreed to have the release date Friday. I think they should have the record at the earliest possible moment.

I may say, Mr. Wechsler, you will be of great assistance if you could get sufficient copies of your exhibits so that there can be no question of any newsmen being denied a copy of all of the exhibits.

Mr. WECHSLER. Senator, it is understood that certain vital exhibits like the Harpers exhibits over which we disagreed, may be inserted in full in the record; is that right?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I may say this, as far as I am concerned, while this is an executive session, which are rather expensive as far as records are concerned, where you feel strongly that an exhibit should be a part of the record, we will try to accommodate you, but I do wish you will keep the request to a minimum. We can do this for you. We can tell you how many different newspapers have ordered copies of the record. Perhaps you could provide an equal number of copies of exhibits.

Mr. Flanagan has called attention to the fact that once this is made public, then it can be printed as a public document, and I guess the committee does not have to pay for it. I hate to be quibbling so much about the cost here, but we are operating on a very, very tight budget.

Mr. WECHSLER. I understand our target is to get this into Friday's papers.

Mr. COHN. Why do we have to have a target date? We have a lot of other pressing business in the committee. I am up to my neck. Do we have to meet a time?

The CHAIRMAN. I would say this: I think Mr. Wechsler is anxious to have this made public soon. I think we should try to accommodate him on that. There should not be much difficulty. We have an excellent reporter, I am sure the transcript is in good shape.

Incidentally, I may ask the attorney, Did you find many others you want to correct in the original?

Mr. BERGER. They seem to be mostly grammatical, and I think in some cases possibly some omissions which were not deliberate. From my experience in reading records, I would say that they were the usual omissions that you would find when a stenographer is trying to make a very fast transcript of the testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it should be unfortunate when the record is released there would be dispute as to whether it is complete.

Mr. BERGER. As I understand it, this was one of the purposes for Mr. Wechsler asking for an opportunity to go over the record, so there would be no dispute whatever as to omissions. We hope, before the release takes place, that we will have every opportunity to go over the record and make sure there are no such omissions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wechsler, could you do this, could you tonight go over the exhibits which you think must be in the original record in order to make it complete and then give us a list of the other exhibits and when this is made public, this can be printed as a public record.

Mr. WECHSLER. I think quite seriously the problem is not on our side. I am here, I am hoping to go back to work. I am going to do this as fast as I can. I think the problem is on your side in terms of getting this read.

Senator JACKSON. It really boils down to the question of exhibits.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are you prepared to work tonight if Mr. Cohn is prepared to work tonight?

The CHAIRMAN. If you will submit them to me in the morning, in a matter of 3 minutes I am sure I can tell you whether I agree with you. Try and keep it at the very minimum. If you submit those in the morning, we will in a matter of 5 minutes work it out.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will we have a chance to look at it, too?

The CHAIRMAN. If I agree with Mr. Wechsler on what should be submitted, I thought I would not have to bother you. If I disagree with him, then I would like to take it up.

Mr. COHN. Shall we meet in this room at 10 o'clock?

The CHAIRMAN. Why do we not meet either in my office or Senator Symington's office.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think we ought to meet in the chairman's office.

The CHAIRMAN. Could we meet in my office at 9 o'clock?

Mr. WECHSLER. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. This list will not be made a part of the public record.

Also submitted as exhibits are the following editorials or excerpts therefrom, marked "Exhibits Nos. 31, 32, and 33," and filed for the information of the committee: No. 31, the Washington Post of April 30, 1953, entitled "Definition of Tyranny"; No. 32, New York Post article, May 2, 1953, regarding the Louisville Courier-Journal editorial of May 2, 1953, entitled "Free Press Gets a Swift Kick From Joe"; No. 33, Newsday editorial (excerpt) as reported in the New York Post of May 4, 1953; St. Louis Post-Dispatch editorial excerpt as reported in the New York Post of May 4, 1953.

(Whereupon, at 6:15 p. m., the hearing was recessed to the call of the Chair.)

APPENDIX

EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT No. 22

[From the Nation, September 30, 1939]

STALIN AND UNION SQUARE

(By James Wechsler)

For two decades American radicals have participated vicariously in the triumphs and retreats of the Soviet regime. Events in Moscow have molded their thinking, overshadowed native politics, conditioned their emotional level. The 10 days of October that John Reed chronicled were to influence American radical thought for a generation; and in August 1939, the 10 days that elapsed between Berlin's announcement and Moscow's ratification of the German-Russian pact seemed equally momentous. Certainly not since the advance of Hitler had there been an equivalent period of tension, so deep a premonition of change. A month later one can still only hint at the possible repercussions among those who, for better or worse, had been wedded to the fortunes of the Russian revolution.

This article, written in the immediate chaotic aftermath of the event, aims to give an outline of what representative radicals and liberals were thinking in this period of upheaval. There was, I believe, wide agreement that final judgments must be suspended and even tentative theories held subject to change without notice. One can only reproduce the immediate picture and suggest the eventualities which would prove decisive. Put simply: if the pact is the forerunner of a full-fledged military alliance against the West, its effect in American leftist circles will be overwhelming. If no such sweeping and permanent accord emerges, there is likely to be a period of prolonged ferment in which new alignments will be indefinitely delayed.

The major concomitant of the line of the democratic front adopted by the Comintern in 1935 was the creation of a multitude of non-Communist groups. They carried the banners of anti-Fascist unity among "men of good will"; they preached collective security against Fascist aggression; their programs bore little resemblance to the sectarian dogmas identified with the third period. The extent to which these organizations were controlled by Communists has been a permanent source of debate; the important fact is that they were enthusiastically supported by large numbers of non-Communists who felt varying degrees of affection for the party itself and were bracketed under the classification of fellow travelers. Few voices were raised against Communist participation in these groups because, by and large, Communist policy from 1935 to 1939 harmonized with the position of large numbers of independent progressives for whom the growth of fascism was the central fact of political life. Then on August 21 a European dispatch suddenly shattered the framework within which this unity had flourished.

At once there were several important defections from the company of fellow travelers. Turmoil was perceptible in bodies like the League for Peace and Democracy. It was evident that the stir would be most pronounced in those groups where liberal, middle-class, intellectual elements predominated. Undoubtedly the party will minimize such defections in terms of those adjectives. But certainly they define the circles in which the Communists have made their most impressive inroads during the last 4 years. The names of the casualties

are less important than the fact that most of them had ardently identified themselves with popular-front objectives. Heywood Broun, who had steadfastly condemned attacks on Communists and affirmed their value in progressive groups, has announced that "we want neither Stalin nor Coughlin here." Paul de Kruif is quoted as declaring that "the only red in me is red, white, and blue." James Waterman Wise, in an article in *Opinion*, passionately denounces the "Russian betrayal." While these have been the loudest declarations of divorce from well-known fellow travelers, others are impending or have been uttered privately. Within the American Student Union, Joseph P. Lash, its executive secretary, has sharply criticized the pact; similar reactions have been voiced by other pro-Soviet executives of democratic front movements.

Such developments are undoubtedly manifestations of a far-flung trend. But they do not constitute the whole story. There is probably an equal body of opinion still unprepared to render a final verdict; its chief characteristic is bewilderment. While almost universal dismay is felt over the timing of the pact, there is considerable reluctance to believe that it foreshadows an ideological alliance or that the primary guilt is Stalin's rather than Chamberlain's.

And because this is true, the full fury of left resentment at the pact was not unleashed on Moscow. A considerable disposition still exists, moreover, to hope for a turn as swift as those which have already occurred. Among those most distraught by such events as the Moscow trials, the most pessimistic views are heard; among those less disposed to question earlier developments, there is less haste in rendering judgment; and among the most permanently devout fellow travelers, persons like Corliss Lamont, whose faith in Soviet policy has never wavered, one finds a quick adjustment to what is cryptically called "a new situation." Vincent Sheean, who has warmly espoused Russian policy in foreign affairs, has also affirmed his confidence in the new policy.

These shadings of opinion could be enumerated indefinitely, but one reaction is almost universal among popular-front intellectuals. It is prompted less by the actions of the Soviet Union than by the utterances of the American Communist Party, the succession of ambiguous, frequently conflicting, but no less dogmatic statements which streamed out of party headquarters in the days after the signing of the pact. The *Daily Worker's* 24-hour silence was at worst pitiable; it assumed an almost dignified aspect in contrast with ensuing somersaults. There was, first of all, Earl Browder's prophecy that the pact would contain an escape clause; it didn't. There was the assurance voiced by Israel Amter in the prewar hours that if Poland really fought, the U. S. S. R. would come to its aid. There was the fervid plea for help to Poland carried by the *Daily Worker*; a fortnight later the same paper rejoiced at the political death of Poland's "semi-Fascist clique." And throughout this period there was the slow emergence of a new foreign policy in the editorials of the Communist press, an evolution never accompanied by recognition of earlier errors. Each day, it appeared, the party was ruthlessly advancing to a position which the next day's events compelled it to abandon. To those asking for leadership it offered only the most desperate and unpersuasive rationalizations. And it offered them with neither humility nor reticence.

I found, in conversation with a host of individuals heretofore sympathetic to the party, that this tragic blundering had left a deep scar. They were almost unanimous in feeling that the party had been reduced to the role of a social secretary for Moscow, sending out apologies for its employer's antics without any comprehension of what they meant. This reaction was not a crude complaint against a "Moscow gold arrangement" for services rendered; it was a reaction against the lack of independence, self-reliance, and native reorientation allegedly revealed by the performance. Fundamentally it expressed revulsion against an institution in which intellectual consistency appeared less important than maintaining the doctrine of Soviet infallibility.

And as the new party position has crystallized, a further area of distrust has been opened. For 4 years the party had argued that even the admittedly imperfect capitalist democracies of Western Europe were incalculably preferable to German fascism. When its critics accused the party of false devotion to the democratic system, it pointed to the Communist defense of republican Spain. Then, overnight, the party press shifted its attack from fascism to "imperialist democracy," proclaimed that it had no favorites in the new "imperialist war," and rediscovered the plight of British colonial subjects. I emphasize again that those who are critical of this intellectual somersault share a good measure of Communist skepticism toward the present French and British Governments. What they resent is the party's soft-pedaling of previously accepted

distinctions between these regimes and Nazi rule. In the light of these altered policies many liberals and radicals see only the bleakest future for the "united-front organizations" in which the Communists have figured so prominently. Can these organizations survive without Communist inspiration? Conversely, can they survive if the Communists seek to impose their newly acquired policies on them? I have heard that within the League for Peace and Democracy there is a 40 percent bloc critical of Russian policy, the remaining being either neutral or sympathetic. On what platform, if any, can these divergent views be united? Will there be a shift toward the isolationism now manifest in Communist policy? Will the drive for repeal of the embargo be pressed as vigorously as it would have been before the Communist reorientation? Will the Communists slowly retire again to the position of relative obscurity which they held before the new line was adopted? And if they do, will the organizations which they helped to create survive their departure?

The deepening uncertainty has, momentarily at least, produced a new kind of refugee—the homeless radical. In the past he has been identified with efforts in which the Communist Party played a vital role. He has belonged to groups and leagues and committees which were pro-Soviet, anti-Fascist, and dedicated in an immediate sense to the protection of bourgeois democracy. He may have been Socialist in ultimate conviction, or committed to nothing more drastic than reforms within the framework of capitalistic democracy. He is now confronted with the necessity of evaluating his own position, rediscovering some organizational ties, or fleeing into a lonely isolation. Where does he go from here?

I have already encountered tentative groping toward a new alignment. Its most likely form would be a loose, flexible body comparable to the "New Beginnings" group which emerged in post-Hitler Germany, a group socialist in ultimate objective but committed to no orthodox doctrine or to any international, and unwilling to assume the shape and functions of a political party until its strength has been established. It would strive to revitalize native currents in American radicalism, formulate a declaration of American radical independence and shape a program for the unorganized American left as the war develops. Its most immediate goals would be the defense of civil liberties, especially as they are threatened by "emergency decrees," and protection of the social gains achieved under the New Deal. Neither the form nor the content of such a grouping is any clearer than I have indicated, nor has its organization advanced beyond the discussion stage. The usefulness of such a project probably depends upon the existence of a time interval here, if not in Europe, in which some measure of reconstruction can be achieved. What it would primarily offer is an immediate alternative to individual flight.

If the ranks of those who had allied themselves with "democratic front" groups without accepting the credo of the party have been depleted, no comparable movement is evident within the party itself. Tumultuous debates at unit meetings have been followed by threatened resignations and these in turn by reconversions, but by and large the ranks have remained firm, even as the line wavered. There is no simple explanation for this phenomenon. It is deeply rooted in the habits of mind and the attitude toward society that pervade the Communist ranks. The cardinal factor, most observers agree, is the survival of the "faith." And the major article of this faith is the incorruptibility of the U. S. S. R. For two decades Communist policy throughout the world has veered sharply, often in opposing directions; but loyalty to the Soviet Union has remained fixed.

But this is not the only explanation of the party's solidity. While the Communists since 1935 have abandoned a good many of their most sectarian habits, they have retained a half-veiled suspicion and distrust of the world beyond the party. It was not a "respectable" party even when its position conformed most closely to that of the moderately respectable New Deal. Then suddenly, with the signing of the pact, the peril of its own isolation loomed again. Now was the time for all good men to come to the aid of the party. They did.

Shortly after the invasion of Poland a mass meeting was staged in Madison Square Garden. Beforehand there was considerable speculation: would the Garden be half empty, would the meeting be listless, would there be large-scale heckling? In fact the Garden was jammed, the crowd almost frenzied in its enthusiasm, dissenters nowhere in evidence. Not that ideological clarity had been miraculously restored. The crowd appeared at times uncertain as to whether boos or cheers were called for in the light of the new policy. The most bitter jeers were inspired by reference to the Trotskyites and Lovestoneites, toward whom the party position was obviously unaltered. Except for Earl Browder's address the speeches dealt with trivial details: Mother Bloor talked

of old times and of making New York a finer city; Charles Krumbein talked endlessly of many minor matters; there was a good deal of singing and cheering, and old revolutionary songs, reminiscent of the "third period," were once more restored to prominence. The thing that stood out in the meeting was the almost desperate huddling together of people confronted by a monumental world crisis, taking refuge in a reaffirmation of their own solidarity. One felt that what was said from the speakers' platform was less important to the audience than the reassuring knowledge that 20,000 people agreed with it.

There is a final factor which explains the ease with which at least a section of the party has adjusted itself to the new line. It must be remembered that even in the era of the popular front there were many "old Bolsheviks" within the party who maintained a cynical reticence while outwardly embracing capitalist democracy. The party never developed any systematic elaboration of a democratic credo. To many of its adherents, even amid the most rhapsodic devotion to the New Deal, the dictatorship of the proletariat remained a far more glowing emblem.

But in some circles, within the party as well as outside, neither official rationalizations nor the appearance of stability in a crisis, both of which the party offers, have sufficed. Already it has been reported that Granville Hicks has resigned from the party and is publishing a statement of the reasons for his withdrawal in the New Republic. Robert Forsythe's name has been removed, at his request, from the masthead of the New Masses. Richard Rovere, one of the New Masses' younger editors, has also withdrawn. Inevitably, of course, such defections were bound to occur first among the intellectuals, not necessarily because they are "intellectuals," but because their task is the verbal refinement of party policy. And it is this task which has been rendered so grotesque in recent weeks. There have been other resignations both among writers and among the rank and file. But the bulk of party writers is likely to remain devoted, at least pending some even more spectacular development. The most primitive interpretation of this fealty is that they have a "vested interest" in the party's existence. In a sense they have; but it is above all an emotional investment. The same condition prevails in the higher realms of the party leadership, from which no reports of defection have emanated.

A Communist leader cannot easily find another political foothold; no other left groups are clamoring for his services, and an effective revolt within the party cannot be readily engineered. Under these conditions men seldom resolve their doubts; they steel themselves against having them. It is still premature to say that no split may ultimately evolve out of the present ferment. But in both its ideological tenacity and its organizational structure the Communist Party is singularly well equipped to avert that development. Not that the party rank and file will remain permanently intact. It never has even in less troubled moments. The annual "turnover" in membership has always been large. Present events are likely to increase the ratio of this turnover. The real question is whether, as in the past, it will be compensated for by new recruits or whether these developments will prevent the filling of the gaps created by slow and unspectacular defections. Not even the party leadership knows the answer.

There is, of course, a group within the party which has never felt too much enthusiasm for the official words of party chieftains and has resented their intellectual double bookkeeping. But its members insist that such vulgarities of method and presentation are subordinate to the need for a disciplined movement in an era of crisis. Their position is a compound of rigid faith in the U. S. S. R., of hope for its eventual fulfillment of international pledges, and of charity toward a movement which has weathered so many tempests. Genuinely perturbed by defections around them, they calmly recite Lenin's prophecy: When the locomotive of history takes a sharp turn, only the steadfast cling to the train.

While the pro-popular-front liberals grope for their bearings and the bulk of Communist Party members remain fixed in their devotion, the other left parties have tried, not too effectively, to strengthen their ranks. In this camp the three outstanding groups are the Socialist Party, led by Norman Thomas; the Independent Labor League, led by Jay Lovestone; and the Socialist Workers' Party, following Leon Trotsky. Typical of the smaller groups is the League for a Revolutionary Workers' Party. All these organizations have been consistently and fiercely anti-Stalinist; all of them have assumed the corrupt nature of the Soviet regime and now interpret the Russo-German pact as a vindication of their Cassandra-like warnings. Their utterances since the pact reflect relief at the fulfillment of their prophecies. Not that joy is unconfined; it would be

inaccurate to suggest that they are unaware of the darkness of the world scene. The pact's effect on their policies, however, is far less striking than its effect on the Communist Party. Before the pact they insisted that the coming war was a struggle between rival imperialisms, and they still say so. To that extent, paradoxically enough, their position roughly coincides with the new program of the Communist Party. But the heritage of factional strife, even among these anti-Stalinist groups, is so bitter that no unity has been achieved; and their broad agreement with the Communist position on war is unlikely to obscure the more passionate discord over Russia's role. Meanwhile, the Social Democratic Federation, through its organ, the New Leader, remains virtually alone among organized groups in advancing the position that Hitlerism must be smashed, that this war is an anti-Fascist war, and that if American military intervention is necessary, it should be forthcoming.

The central fact is that these are moments of transition among radical and liberal forces. If the issue of Russian policy has once more troubled and divided them, it must now be seen in the context of the greater issue of the war itself. And the attitude of the left toward the war is still not finally crystallized except in the ranks of the official parties. Numerically the left in America has never constituted a formidable bloc. It has had significance as an intellectual avant garde bringing fresh and challenging insights at a time when traditional doctrines were being repudiated. Its fulfillment of that function now depends upon its own clarity and the accord which it can achieve within its ranks. The darkest aspect of the present period is the confusion which has gripped so large a section of the left and the internal warfare which destroys its efforts. Its immediate survival may be threatened by an onrush of repressive legislation in Washington. Its ultimate direction may still be determined by the future course of Russian policy.

EXHIBIT No. 23

[Excerpt from the New Masses, October 10, 1939]

Finally, there came the piece de resistance, an article by James Wechsler entitled "Stalin and Union Square" (it has nothing to do with either Stalin or Union Square) in the Nation of September 30. "This article," Mr. Wechsler tells us in the second paragraph, "written in the immediate chaotic aftermath of the event, aims to give an outline of what representative radicals and liberals were thinking in this period of upheaval." One discovers on reading the article that Granville Hicks is a representative radical, but not Earl Browder, that Heywood Brown is a representative something or other, but not Mike Gold. As for Corliss Lamont, who has continued to support Soviet policy despite the defection of Mr. Wechsler's handful of "representative radicals and liberals," he is dismissed with a sneer as "among the most permanently devout fellow travelers." Then there was that Communist meeting at Madison Square Garden which the "representative radicals and liberals" had expected to be a flop. "In fact the Garden was jammed," Mr. Wechsler writes, "the crowd almost frenzied in its enthusiasm, dissenters nowhere in evidence. Not that ideological clarity had been miraculously restored. [Perish the thought, since it would wreck Mr. Wechsler's thesis.—A. B. M.] The crowd appeared at times uncertain as to whether boos or cheers were called for in the light of the new policy." Another sneer, and the proposition is proved.

In his third paragraph Mr. Wechsler unloads this:

"The major concomitant of the line of the 'democratic front' adopted by the Comintern in 1935 was the creation of a multitude of non-Communist groups. They carried the banners of anti-Fascist unity among 'men of good will'; they preached collective security against Fascist aggression; their programs bore little resemblance to the sectarian dogmas identified with the 'third period.' The extent to which these organizations were 'controlled' by Communists has been a permanent source of debate; the important fact is that they were enthusiastically supported by large numbers of non-Communists who felt varying degrees of affection for the party itself and were bracketed under the classification of 'fellow travelers.'"

Mr. J. B. Matthews of the Dies committee would disagree. He would never think of putting quotation marks around "controlled," nor would he admit that there could be any debate about the matter. Clearly, Mr. Wechsler is a bright young man who has grown a trifle giddy and Gitlowish from the fact that he

was once briefly on the inside. And like all such people, he isn't too fastidious about facts—many of the united-front organizations, such as the American League for Peace and Democracy and the American Youth Congress, were formed prior to 1935; and Robert Forsythe's name disappeared from the masthead of *New Masses* 2 months before the signing of the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact. But not factual misstatement so much as innuendo is the sniper's weapon. And by innuendo it is possible to adumbrate a lie greater than any outright falsehood.

Mr. Wechsler's article is something more than cynical reporting. It is a political platform. "I have already encountered tentative groping toward a new alinement," he writes. "Its most likely form would be a loose, flexible body comparable to the 'New Beginnings' group which emerged in post-Hitler Germany, a group Socialist in ultimate objective but committed to no orthodox doctrine or to any international, and unwilling to assume the shape and functions of a political party until its strength has been established. * * * Neither the form nor the content of such a grouping is any clearer than I have indicated, nor has its organization advanced beyond the discussion stage."

In short, an organization of fainthearts and muddleheads, of armyless generals who are unable to agree on anything except hostility to communism. The American people are waiting breathlessly for such leadership. Mr. Wechsler doesn't know it of course, but his reference to the German "New Beginnings" group was none too happy. That group arose within German Social Democracy, professing to be dissatisfied with the policies of its official right-wing leadership. But its very first manifesto was strongly anti-Communist and anti-Soviet. Today it is a reactionary little sect, working closely with the Brandler group, the German counterpart of the American Lovestoneites, doing its bit to keep the German people divided.

The Wechsler article marks a new low in liberal journalism. That it could have appeared in a magazine like the *Nation* is a symptom of something more than confusion. Powerful currents are running in America and the world. A new offensive against civil liberties is under way. It finds expression not only through specifically reactionary channels, but through individuals or groups who out of weakness, confusion, or opportunism provide weapons for reaction. But as the experience of Germany has shown, those who are unable to see who the real enemy is are unlikely themselves to be spared. Those who in this imperialist war crisis give comfort to the warmongers can expect no peace.

A. B. MAGIL.

EXHIBIT No. 24

[From the *Progressive*, February 1949]

THE TRIAL OF OUR TIMES

(By James A. Wechsler¹)

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Six months ago most Americans had never heard of Alger Hiss or Whittaker Chambers. Both were reasonably eminent figures in the worlds in which they moved; Hiss after a State Department career that ultimately took him to the historic international conferences at Yalta and San Francisco, had become president of the Carnegie Foundation for International Peace while Chambers rose on the masthead of Henry Luce's *Time* to the lofty perch of senior editor.

But until August 3, 1948, it is unlikely that one American in a thousand could have identified either man; surely there was no public intimation that their names were destined for immortality in the annals of this era and that the Hiss-Chambers "case," as it came to be known, would automatically denote a period in our national life just as, on vastly different levels, the Sacco-Vanzetti case and the Hall-Mills affair reflected the preoccupations of earlier times. Certainly the children of both men could hardly have guessed that words spoken in a congressional hearing room on an August day would forever destroy their anonymity.

¹ EDITOR'S NOTE.—James A. Wechsler, the *Progressive's* Washington correspondent, sat through and reported countless hours of testimony before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Wechsler is on the Washington staff of the *New York Post*.

On that day Chambers, testifying in response to a subpoena, named Hiss as a member of a prewar Communist network operating inside the Government. Chambers said Hiss knew him well as "Carl," underground Communist agent, and that they had been close friends as well as political comrades before Chambers quit. And 48 hours later Hiss, unlike many others whom Chambers accused, took the stand and denied everything under oath. He was shown photographs of Chambers and said he could not identify them; but he asked for a face-to-face meeting. Later he agreed he had known Chambers—not as Communist "Carl" but as a free-lance writer named George Crosley. And Chambers in turn denied he had ever used that name.

A great deal has happened since the midsummer scenes. Within the next few weeks Hiss will stand trial for perjury. It is a basic presumption of Anglo-Saxon law that men are innocent until their guilt is proven; and although many newspapers—sometimes inadvertently and sometimes deliberately—often flout this principle, there is every justification for invoking it in Hiss' behalf at this juncture.

If Hiss is guilty, the agonies he has endured during the months of a great deception are harsher punishment than any sentence a court can pronounce; if he is able to vindicate himself it will be difficult enough to indemnify him for even a fragment of the ordeal to which he has been subjected. Similar observations might be made about Chambers. For whether he has woven a fantasy or reluctantly dug up the skeletons of a rejected past, he has surrendered totally and finally the privacy which the burial of the bones had given him.

Yet whatever shape the truth may finally assume (and there always remains the dismal possibility that even a perjury trial or a libel suit may fail to illuminate the full meaning of the story) speculation in this interim is inevitable. For one thing, the conflict between Hiss and Chambers is one of those episodes in which the most elusive and violent emotions are glimpsed.

To put it one way, the premise that Chambers has deliberately manufactured a monstrous frameup against a man he once knew involves the belief that some furious longing for private vengeance over some undisclosed wrong has tortured his soul for more than 10 years; and that the present action is the long-planned climax of a destructive obsession.

To put it another way, the premise that Chambers is telling the truth dictates the belief that for more than a decade Hiss has suppressed the secret of a political double-life, achieving recognition and respectability by lying to men who reposed the deepest trust in him.

Viewed in either dimension, this conflict assumes a more meaningful and melancholy quality than is usually suggested by an editorial in the Chicago Tribune or the Daily Worker.

II

But it is not only on this level that the Hiss-Chambers relationship has stirred such intense inquiry and debate. If this were only the drama of two men engaged in an incredible psychological duel of deceit, it would be exciting stuff for the Sunday supplements; but it is obviously more than that. The issues raised slash beneath the surface of an era in American history in which, for the first time, the Communist Party influenced the Nation's intellectual climate.

Chambers' revelations have rolled back time to the days when the Popular Front was a dominant factor in the thinking and experiences of thousands—even millions—of Americans; when Marxist study groups and front organizations and committees to aid Spanish democracy and Friends of the Soviet Union permeated wide areas and enlisted the allegiances of many people, neither "quaker" nor alien, who finally established varying degrees of easy familiarity with the Communist apparatus. This setting explains much of the passion aroused by the Hiss-Chambers clash. And for obvious reasons. Men who were alined on rival sides of the political battles of those years now feel an extraordinary personal involvement in the case. Hiss' trial has become—retroactively—a judgment day for that period, which was the heyday of the New Deal.

The subsequent disclosure that Chambers obtained secret Government documents from agents within the Government has increased the bitterness of these debates, confirming on the one hand the darkest insinuations of conservatives and creating a vicarious sense of guilt among those who, remembering their own emotional curves in those years, have the humility to observe to themselves: "There but for the grace of God * * *"

These real or imagined stakes in the contest have given risen to the two alternative theories of righteous certainty that have emerged since the case first became the talk of this and many other towns.

On the one hand there are some New Dealers, many of whom knew Hiss well, mingled with him socially and shared offices with him, who insist it is inconceivable that he is guilty. In part the vigor of these affirmations is a personal tribute to the man, and character testimony is not irrelevant. Yet one gets the curious sense that the earnestness of these protestations expresses more than detached personal estimate. It is as if they were saying this could not be true because if it were true it would cast fatal discredit upon the New Deal age; it would confirm the allegations of high treason so often leveled against the Roosevelt liberals by the right.

Related to this apprehension, I think, is the continuing reluctance of many liberals who identified themselves with popular front ventures to believe even now that there is any reality in the picture of Communist intrigue and espionage. There are still grown men—and I suspect that Henry Wallace offered the classic example during the last election campaign—who refuse to believe that the Communist movement is a wing of the Soviet intelligence service; that it is no less an agent of Soviet nationalism than the bund was a vehicle of the Nazi conspiracy; that the humanitarian and idealistic images it invokes (and to which many individual Communists no doubt continue to give subjective allegiance) are merely weapons in the shifting strategy of the Soviet foreign office, to be utilized in a time of the popular front and repudiated during a partnership with nazism.

The conclusion that Alger Hiss is guilty, that he was a conscious participant in the machinations of Soviet intelligence agents, becomes an intolerable one to men who may furtively realize how close they were to imitation of that role. Acceptance of this notion would seem to suggest that all or many of the progressive movements of the 1930's were a vast hoax, a thin camouflage for the calculated operations of foreign spies. In the world of 1949 (in which the intellectual despair created by the fall of Madrid and the deal at Munich is forgotten or only dimly remembered) many liberals who once associated themselves with the Communists cannot endure what they consider to be the implications of Hiss' possible guilt.

On remarkably similar grounds, American reactionaries proclaim it is inconceivable that Hiss is innocent. They, too, read their own wishes and their own self-justification into the record. To them the conviction of Hiss would be history's final damnation of the New Deal cabal. It would, they contend, offer irrefutable proof that the Roosevelt administration during the great years of domestic reform was a Communist plot. (Wasn't Hiss counsel to the Nye committee, blasted by the right as unfair to organized munitionsmakers?) It would prove that F. D. R. was the tool—or collaborator—of Kremlin agents and that the wage-hour measure was written in Moscow.

The doctrinaire rightists fear vindication of Hiss would shatter their preconceptions and give credence to the charge that all anti-Communist exposure is patterned after the Reichstag-fire technique. They want to believe he is guilty especially because his case has aroused defensive gestures by so many New Dealers; if this can be hung on Hiss, the reactionaries believe, it will make all his apologists suspect and it will suggest the conspiracy is farther flung than even Chambers has so far asserted.

To use Hiss as the whippingboy for their own theory of history, they exaggerate his past role; he is depicted as F. D. R.'s brain at Yalta (which he wasn't) and as a major architect of United States foreign policy during the long Roosevelt effort to maintain United States-Soviet unity. If they have their way, the only name that will be remembered as symbolic of the New Deal will be that of a man convicted of smuggling secret American documents to Russian agents. Naturally they can hardly wait for the formal verdict, and they display little reverence for and historic presumption of innocence before trial.

Thus George Sokolsky and others have joyously written numerous essays reaffirming their own prejudices about the New Deal with Hiss' guilt as the premise of their treatises. This conduct is about as exemplary as that of a few liberal columnists who have nervously ridiculed current interest in the spy proceedings as though the phenomenon of divided national loyalties suggested by Chambers' testimony is inconsequential and irrelevant in a democratic society.

All of these things underline the emotional vested interests which so many of us experience with relation to the Hiss-Chambers episode. This writer does not pretend to be aloof to these autobiographical pressures. It seems to me,

however, that before the tumult of the trial begins, the premises of both schools of certainty should be rejected. It was never "impossible" that Alger Hiss could be guilty nor inconceivable that he is innocent; and whatever the outcome, neither his guilt nor his innocence will vindicate the broader claims so freely made now.

III

The report of the Canadian Spy Commission dramatically described how able, enlightened, and subjectively patriotic men were brought into the web of Communist intrigue. This was especially true in the 1930's when men in the democracies began to despair of the foreign policies of their own governments and looked with desperate hopefulness to the Soviet Union; when they identified Russian national interests with peace, internationalism, and the defense of freedom in Spain; when they romantically believed that the rulers of the Soviet foreign office were more disinterested and noble than the "decadent" protectors of the status quo in Downing Street and on Pennsylvania Avenue. Men who were responsive to these considerations were rarely paid agents of Moscow. Many of them, at least, viewed themselves as valiant agents of peace and liberty.

In Canada, entanglements that were inspired by these beliefs—by loss of faith in one's own society and rapturous trust in another—led to espionage. To say that it is impossible that an American was such a man is fantastic; his prototype existed in all countries. To say that the vindication of Hiss will prove that such men did not exist anywhere is equally absurd. But to say that the conviction of Hiss would prove that the New Deal was a Communist conspiracy is an equally fabulous non sequitur.

If Hiss is proved innocent, the sickness in our national life unfolded by Chambers' testimony would still remain cause for anxiety and inquiry. For whether or not Chambers got the secret documents from Hiss, he obtained them from some Americans working within the Government. Further, it should be noted that of all the men named by Chambers as members of the underground Communist ring, Hiss alone filed suit; only a handful of those named by Elizabeth Bentley have similarly contested the charge.

It hardly remains an issue of fact as to whether such rings existed; what we need to know more about is the motivations of the participants, the process through which they succumbed to the intellectual blandishment of the new totalitarian society, the frustrations that swept men into the Communist net. If Hiss was one of those, his admitted talents would merely heighten the significance of the inquiry; his successor may be growing up now. For the question of why the former law secretary of Oliver Wendell Holmes, a bright young man of the New Deal years and—by all accounts—an ambitious, industrious citizen cast his lot with the Soviet spy squad would be no less momentous than the alternative query as to why an ex-Communist poet chose recklessly and maliciously to destroy an innocent who once befriended him. The answer might give little comfort to the thunderous voices on the right.

But neither those liberals who prefer to believe the Communist movement is another lusty variety of indigenous United States radicalism nor those conservatives who want to believe the New Deal was merely another phase of the Communist world conspiracy will contribute much wisdom to the inquiry.

IV

Like nearly everyone else, I have spent many hours pondering the conflicting stories of Hiss and Chambers. As a newspaperman I have devoted a good deal of overtime to some aspects of the case. There are compelling reasons, apart from those inherent in our system of law, for reserving judgment and awaiting possible surprises in the climatic stages of this drama.

When it is over and when—or if—we finally glimpse the total truth, I suspect that the hotel-room confrontation published in this issue of the *Progressive* will make even more dramatic reading than it does now; and that rereading the record of this encounter one will pause at several places, thinking: "Of course, that was it. I should have seen it all there." I have some instinctive feelings now about several passages, but I will not labor them here: men whose judgment I respect have read vastly different meanings into the same lines.

Of one thing, however, I am certain: Anyone who ponders this dialog conducted in a New York hotel room on August 17—14 days after Chambers first leveled his charges against Hiss—will more deeply appreciate the subtle human

contest beneath the legal formalities of the Hiss-Chambers trial. Subsequent to this scene, many crucial events, climaxed by Chambers' unveiling of the hidden documents, have occurred and, where the information appears especially important, footnotes have been added.

At the time this hotel room confrontation was staged there seemed to be a variety of interpretations that could be applied to the encounter. Hiss is obviously angry and distraught; much of the poise he displayed a fortnight earlier on a congressional witness stand has vanished. He snaps at his inquisitors, battles for position, flings angry thrusts at the investigators and Chambers alike.

There were those who said his demeanor reflected the previously suppressed wrath of a man who felt a reckless crucifixion was in progress.

There were others who less generously contended that Hiss' taunts were cries of desperation as he realized that his carefully rehearsed plea of innocence earlier in the hearing room had failed to halt the inquiry.

There are few boundaries to the conjecture aroused by this exchange. It would seem highly probable that one of the two men is simply lying throughout this scene; that their recitals cannot be reconciled.

Yet the theory has also been advanced that, as of that afternoon, both were telling half-truths; that in fact Chambers was exaggerating an earlier relationship with Hiss while the latter was striving to deprecate any suggestion of close attachment, and that the truth lay somewhere in between the two narratives. But the necessary corollary of his view would be that Chambers' subsequent production of the documents was manufactured evidence that Hiss can ultimately explain away.

Finally, there are those who believe that Chambers was in effect imploring Hiss to acknowledge the degree of guilt already ascribed to him—mere association with the Communist ring—so that it would be unnecessary to unfold the papers which presumably damaged both men, transforming the case from the level of Communist affiliation to the more desolate plane of espionage. According to this view, Hiss misinterpreted Chambers' initial failure to produce the documents as assurance that he never would; and Chambers was equally confident that Hiss, correctly understanding his gesture, would never sue for libel.

These hypotheses are set down, as the lawyers say, without prejudice, and only to indicate the psychological and circumstantial wilderness that remains to be explored. It may one day be decisively shown that throughout this session 1 of the 2 men was telling and compounding a great falsehood at the expense of the other. If indeed that is the real substance of this scene, one can only surmise whether the inner anguish of the man who was lying was greater or less than the torment of the man who was telling the truth.

EXHIBIT No. 25

[From the Daily Worker, June 19, 1950]

AROUND THE GLOBE

(By Joseph Clark)

WECHSLER'S LIES CAN'T HALT STRUGGLE FOR PEACE

When it was pointed out to the editor of the New York Post that he lied when he said "they have neglected to circulate the (Stockholm) petition inside the Soviet Union," he didn't retract. Oh no, Goebbels taught that a lie must be repeated again and again to make it stick.

So editor James Wechsler is making this particular lie his crusade. He repeated it again last Wednesday in an editorial charging:

"The backers of the movement have so far failed to propose that the petition should be circulated inside the Soviet Union."

And what will Wechsler write now that we've printed the news that millions of Soviet citizens have already signed the petition? That in the food industry alone 3 million Soviet citizens signed the Stockholm petition? That, in the words of the sponsors of the petition:

"All the peoples of the Soviet Union without exception are engaged in the mass collection of signatures" (June issue of In Defense of Peace, published by the World Congress of the Defenders of Peace).

* * *

Not a day passes in the Soviet Union when Pravda, Izvestia, and papers all over the U. S. S. R. don't report new Soviet organizations and public figures who have signed the Stockholm petition. On a typical day, June 1—2 weeks before the Post's lying editorial—all of Moscow's papers printed the appeal by Soviet children's authors. It is addressed to mothers and fathers and says:

"We appeal to everyone who holds humanity's tomorrow dear. We must unite to save the future of the world. Let us unanimously support the Stockholm appeal. Let us prevent the smoke clouds of another war from enveloping the cradles of our children."

Can you hear their voices, James Wechsler? They are addressing all mothers and fathers—American mothers and fathers as well as Soviet mothers and fathers.

And the Soviet mothers and fathers have already heard their voices. They have signed the Stockholm appeal.

But what are you going to do, James Wechsler? As though we have to ask. Your editorial makes it clear. Let alone sign the pledge to ban the bomb, you propose permanent war until Communists all over the world are "shattered." The word "shattered" is yours, James Wechsler. Yet you complain that the State Department does not play enough peaceful music to accompany its cold war.

"No lasting stabilization is imaginable," you write, "while disciplined Communist troops hold strategic positions in the free world."

Translate that into the English you use when you write about water or litter in the streets, James Wechsler, and what do you have? Your answer to the mothers and fathers of America is an enduring crusade to overthrow the Socialist governments and the movement for socialism all over the world.

Quite a job, James Wechsler, quite a job—shattering the U. S. S. R. Ask Hitler, James Wechsler, he learned. And China, and Korea, and Mongolia, and Vietnam, and Poland, and Czechoslovakia, and Albania, and Rumania, and Hungary, and Bulgaria?

Quite a job, too, to shatter what you call the "Communist machines" in France and Italy and Germany and the rest of the world. You might as well try shattering the working class and its desire for security and a decent livelihood, as well as peace.

* * *

You criticize the cold warriors, not for preparing war. That doesn't bother you—not even the fact that the Ruhr's Nazis have been enlisted in that effort. No; that's not your gripe. You're worried about one thing, you say: "We dare not let the cry for peace become the propaganda monopoly of the Kremlin."

For some time now you've been asking the cold warriors to clean up their propaganda a bit. Make it seem that the atom bomb is a charlotte russe and bacteriological weapons are ice-cream cones.

Come, come, James Wechsler, you might as well try to make Bao Dai and Heinrich Dinkelbach smell like Chanel No. 5.

Hundreds of millions of Stockholm petition signers in America and Russia and all over the world will be stronger than your lies, James Wechsler.

EXHIBIT No. 26

[From the Daily Worker, April 12, 1950]

AROUND THE GLOBE

(By Joseph Clark)

THE "FRIGHTENED CHILD" WHO EDITS THE NEW YORK POST

Recently the New York Post complained that it "had been taken in" by Navy-inspired stories about submarines "sighted" off the coast of California. As in 1948 and 1949 the Navy had concocted these stories just before asking for new appropriations. The Post editor chides the "strategists who believe in frightening editors, Congressmen, and small children to get an extra buck." Whether the ADA editorial writer wants to convince us that he's a "frightened editor" or a "frightened child" we don't know. But we do know he played that submarine fake with relish and malice aforethought.

He's doing exactly the same thing with another fake story he's been palming off for a long time. We refer to the way he prints as gospel truth the blackmail stories from Madrid about Soviet-Franco "deals."

If the way the Navy timed its sub-sighting fake was enough to show how phony it was, just take note of how the Post editor times his "Soviet-Franco" forgeries.

On January 19, Secretary of State Dean Acheson told Congress he was going to press for the lifting of the diplomatic ban on Franco Spain at the next session of the U. N. General Assembly (October 1950). That was the signal for the Post to take Franco at his word and print reports that the Russians were sending wheat to Spain.

Of course the official Soviet news agency, Tass, nailed that lie for what it was. The only real deal in the works was "the negotiations of a new treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation * * * offered by the United States" to Franco.

* * *

But just as the Post editor enjoyed playing the Navy's hoax, so he brazened right along and composed an editorial "that Spain and the Soviet Union have agreed to exchange 100,000 tons of Russian wheat for Spanish cloth to make Red Army uniforms." That \$9 bill was based on another phony story from Madrid, and what it concealed were the actual deals.

On February 7, this year, Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp. arranged the shipment of 44 fighter planes to Franco.

A few weeks later the United States Government itself arranged the shipment of "surplus" potatoes to Franco as a gift to the last remaining member of Hitler's axis.

The payoff was the revelation that Franco Spain is secretly becoming a military partner in the anti-Soviet Atlantic pact. Sydney Gruson cabled the New York Times (April 1) from the Hague, where the Atlantic pact nations were meeting:

"The United States plans to seek British and French approval at the Western Big Three Foreign Ministers Conference in London in May for acquisition of airbases in Spain.

"The subject has been discussed informally among the delegates to the North Atlantic Pact meetings now under way here. * * * According to the information available here, Generalissimo Francisco Franco has made clear his readiness to lease bases to United States in return for diplomatic concessions from the Atlantic pact nations."

* * *

Franco's war-serving industry is controlled by United States firms, and his airbases are already available to the United States strategic bombing air force.

Early in March, a group of high ranking Spanish Army and air force officers left by United States planes for Frankfurt, Germany, where United States brass escorted Franco's brass on a tour of United States military establishments in Germany. And United States News has revealed (January 3, 1950) that United States military planes could land on Spanish airfields the moment we went to war.

We wonder how the New York Post is going to commemorate the establishment of the Spanish Republic which will be marked this Friday? On second thought why wonder? They'll come up with a dream about a Franco deal with Russia. But Americans who have never wavered in their opposition to Franco and fascism will support the Keep the Ban on Fascist Spain conference Friday, as well as the picket line at the National City Bank on Monday. National City Bank has just matched Chase National's \$25 million loan to Franco.

EXHIBIT No. 27

[From the Harpers Magazine, November 1947]

HOW TO RID THE GOVERNMENT OF COMMUNISTS

(By James A. Wechsler)

In his eloquent plea for national sanity in Harper's 2 months ago, Henry Steele Commager left unresolved the narrow but disturbing question now confronting this Government: How can men in a movement run by a foreign power be eliminated from Government without injustice and hysteria? How does democratic society protect itself without destroying its own character and emulating the totalitarianism it seeks to resist?

Two persuasive premises guide the thinking of the men who are now shaping Government policy in this elusive realm. The first is that we are engaged in a worldwide diplomatic and ideological struggle with Russia, with little prospect that the conflict will be swiftly or easily resolved; the second is that one of Russia's most valuable weapons—present and potential—is an international army

of agents organized as "native" Communist parties. Reasonable men must be legitimately frightened by the dimensions this two-world conflict has reached and the danger that it will end in the ultimate catastrophe of war; but unless one argues, as Henry Wallace appears to, that the burden of guilt in this duel rests on America and unless one dismisses as fantasy the modern record of the Communist parties, the need for minimum safeguards seems inescapable.

Obviously, the American Communists are incapable of staging a revolutionary coup in the foreseeable future; and only true disbelievers in the democratic process assert that American society lacks the strength to combat the large-scale promotion of Communist ideas. J. Edgar Hoover himself has publicly opposed the outlawry of the Communist Party, and only the lunatic fringe in Congress has clamored for the suppression of Communist propaganda. In some measure, at least, hysteria over the Communist issue has been deliberately exaggerated by the Communists themselves to obscure the real problem. That problem is the exclusion of Communists from Government—not because they are non-conformists, not because they have read the works of V. I. Lenin, not because they agitate against the poll tax, but because the Communist parties are organized instruments of Russian espionage, disruption, and—in the event of war—full-fledged sabotage.

What the Communists will do in wartime at signals flashed from the Kremlin was tragically demonstrated in France—and on a less calamitous scale in the United States—during the Nazi-Soviet pact. Political strikes in American defense plants were a miniature of the more grandiose betrayal staged by the powerful French Communist machine after Molotov proclaimed that fascism was "a matter of taste." There is little historical quarrel on this point outside of the orthodox journals of the shifting Communist theology. Even more relevant now is the story of Soviet espionage in Canada unfolded in the report of the Canadian Royal Commission. The suspensions of civil rights that accompanied the Canadian spy inquiry have been justifiably decried by lawyers and libertarians alike. But the ultimate findings are grimly meaningful to a country seeking to deal with the same problem in a democratic context.

For the Canadian report is a fascinating and revelatory study in the psychology as well as the pattern of Communist behavior. It demonstrates beyond dispute the link between the Soviet intelligence network and homegrown Communist parties. It also depicts in detail the strange process by which men who are drawn to the Communist movement by devoutly idealistic symbols become full-fledged spies in the service of a foreign power—not for monetary reward and usually with the loftiest rationalizations of their conduct. They are stirred by the concept of internationalism. They are taught to identify the welfare of humanity everywhere with Soviet national interests. They learn to regard concealment of their own political identities and transmission of official secrets as noble tricks against the pillars of society. Finally, when the political hypnosis is completed, they have resolved all inner doubt. They are agents. Describing the systematic education which transforms well-intentioned fellow travelers into useful cogs in the espionage machine, the Canadian report said:

"Indeed a sense of internationalism seems in many cases to play a definite role in one stage of the courses. In these cases, the Canadian sympathizer is first encouraged to develop a sense of loyalty, not directly to a foreign state but to what he conceives to be an international idea. This subjective internationalism is then usually linked almost inextricably through the indoctrination courses and the intensive exposure to the propaganda of a particular foreign state, with the current conception of the national interests of that foreign state and with the current doctrines and policies of Communist parties throughout the world."

And further:

"The evidence we have heard shows that at each stage of development the adherent is kept in ignorance of the wider ramifications and real objectives of the organization, to one of the fringes of which he has allowed himself to be attached."

In these Koestlerian fragments we glimpse the real nature of the dilemma facing the democracy that is the direct target of this enterprise. For the Communist movement—like the Nazi international—is essentially an underground society. Its moral codes and its habits of thought are often remote and implausible to people steeped in a democratic tradition.

When Mr. Wallace professes doubt that Communists are actually agents of the Soviet Government, he really articulates his own disbelief that anybody schooled in Western democracy could act like a character in the Canadian spy drama. When liberals exhibit reluctance to accept the proposition that Com-

munists must be barred from Government, it is because they regard the earnest Communists they have known as simply another, if peculiarly fanatic, species of left-wing thought. What they underestimate are the subjective rationalizations which skilled and cynical Communist operatives offer their new subjects; the extent to which the novice may be used—unwittingly—in the early stages of his development; and the ultimate intellectual corruption that marks the final triumph of the commissar.

Any purge, however circumspect and limited, involves risks to democratic institutions. The hazards must be balanced against the consequences of wide-eyed innocence and simple-minded incredulity. To European social-democrats the nature of the Communist thrust is infinitely plainer than it is to us; they have faced the full fury of what Harold Laski called the disciplined secret battalions. In the light of the European story of the past two decades and the Canadian disclosures of 1945, the rule of reason would seem clear: Communists (no less than Fascists who operate in any remnants of the Nazi International and in such units of potential Fascist resurgence as the Christian Front) must be excluded from Government—while their rights to raise hell through the public channels of democratic debate are vigorously reaffirmed. Ideas are not the enemy; an awareness of the distinction between communism as an idea and the Communist parties as battalions of Soviet espionage and sabotage is essential to any national wisdom. It is that distinction which both Congressman Rankin and William Z. Foster try to blur. Rankin, and the frightened men around him, would destroy all dissent as an expression of communism. Foster publicly depicts the Communist Party as a native American voice of dissent.

To say that these ambiguities are overwhelming and that any loyalty procedure in Government is intrinsically doomed to become a replica of the Palmer raids in 1920 is in effect to let reaction run the program as it pleases. For the Communist apparatus does exist in the real world. If liberals cannot face the reality of Communist intrigue as they once recognized the scope of the Fascist fifth column, the congressional cops will run the show; if liberals cannot offer an affirmative, clearly defined plan of democratic self-defense the witch hunt may truly be upon us.

II

But what's really going on in Washington? Are we on the eve of a new Palmer foray against nonconformists? Is a police state rising on the Potomac, as some liberal journalists have darkly reported? Are liberals convening in cellars, destroying old copies of the Nation and old letters from unorthodox girl friends? Is there any real chance that reason and temperance will guide the loyalty investigations?

The answer is that so far the picture is far less stark and conclusive than some of the widely publicized horror stories. Investigation of loyalty did not begin with the Executive order issued by Harry Truman on March 21. As far as the present generation of Government employes is concerned, such inquiries became systematic and widespread during the early months of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. They were carried on throughout the war. In the war years the Civil Service Commission itself investigated 395,000 employees. Of these 1,300 were removed because there appeared reasonable ground for doubting their loyalty. Approximately 700 of this group were in the Communist category. The FBI, military and naval intelligence, and other groups staged similar inquiries. There were absurdities and wrongs committed, as anybody who inhabited wartime Washington knows. Yet in perspective it may appear more significant that we waged the most farflung war in our history without even faintly resembling a police state, that the sporadic "terror" was usually more foolish than fierce, and that our liberties survived the war without major scars.

All of which merely suggests that the fact of investigation does not automatically breed a disastrous witch hunt, and that a human equation—such as the presence of such conscientious people as Arthur S. Flemming, Harry B. Mitchell, and Frances Perkins as heads of the Civil Service Commission—can keep it from going to excesses. But our wartime experience also underlines the nature of the risks involved and the character of the safeguards that must be invoked. From what we have learned it now seems clear that the success or failure of the loyalty inquiry will be determined by the resolution of these two unsettled questions:

(1) Will accused employees receive protections that genuinely protect, inspiring the confidence of honest men rather than offering a field day for amateur and professional heresy hunters?

(2) Will we evolve criteria of judgment that plainly differentiate non-conformists (on the left or right) from participants in underground conspiratorial movements run from a foreign capital or—as in the case of pro-Fascists—clearly identified with the now homeless Nazi international?

With respect to both questions the program enunciated by President Truman on March 21 was alternately unsatisfactory and inadequate. But the door is still wide open to elaboration and refinement of that order. A good many of the wiser officials in the capital have been sweating over these questions ever since the statement was promulgated. The important facts about contemporary Washington are that persons like Flemming, Mitchell, and Miss Perkins are deeply sensitive to the complexity of the issues and that the administration itself has shown little of the zeal for irresponsible persecution suggested by some of the more thunderous outcries on the left. Both Attorney General Clark and J. Edgar Hoover have manifested visible concern over liberal criticisms leveled against the terms of the program. While some conscientious detractors have hinted that this concern is purely political, it is slightly gratuitous to complain when men in high office view liberal politics as sound politics.

As the loyalty machinery now operates more than 1 million Federal employees will be subjected to at least routine review. (It is not true, as generally imagined, that all of them were investigated in wartime; tens of thousands went on the Government payroll in those hectic years without any scrutiny.) The FBI checks their names against its own records and all other current dossiers of subversion, including the notoriously unreliable files compiled by the peerless peephole artists of the House Un-American Activities Committee. If any "derogatory information" is revealed in any of these documents, the FBI conducts further inquiry, forwards a report—without recommendation—to the Civil Service Commission, which transmits the findings to the agency involved. If the Administrator decides to act upon the data (and in the current political weather the pressure to do so will be strong) he must give the accused a summary of the charges, a chance to testify with counsel before a departmental review board, and an opportunity to seek personal review by the agency head. Then, finally, the case may be carried to a new, overall Civil Service Commission review body which will presumably be composed of outstanding, disinterested citizens.

So far all this might be classified as progress; it formalizes heretofore shadowy rights of review and appeal and creates a supreme tribunal that is dependent on neither Congress nor Government for favor. But the order also contains this crucial joker:

"The charges shall be stated as specifically and completely as, in the discretion of the employing department or agency, security considerations permit."

In effect this means that the FBI will retain its authority to decide how much of its case shall be disclosed. It means the victim may receive only the most fragmentary picture of the evidence on which he is being convicted and utterly no chance to confront the witnesses whose words may exile him from Government.

The traditional defense for this course is that a security agency often cannot reveal the sources of its information—or even the full facts at its command—without permanently destroying the usefulness of its informers. Since stool pigeons are the key figures in most investigative cases, this explanation cannot glibly be thrown out of court.

But the exclusion of any man or woman from Government service is also serious business. Moreover there are many cases in which informants are local janitors, women scorned, and village idiots who have no just claim to anonymity. Conceding that the problem isn't simple, the solution clearly rests in the hands of the proposed national review board and its regional counterparts.

This board must be empowered, in cases that it holds doubtful and inconclusive, to require the FBI to produce the full details of its findings and the witnesses from whom it was obtained. Admittedly this may make life tougher for the political G-men. But once again alternatives must be closely weighed.

The board's activities will also be gravely hampered if no records are kept of the lower-level hearings that precede final appeal. Each case will come up cold, with only the bare outline of general charge and categorical denial. All the previous appeals will be little more than waste motion.

Technically the decisions of the top board will be only "advisory." However, this is probably a verbal quibble, since few administrators will be likely to defy its conclusions, and most of them will welcome its existence as a powerful moral backstop for themselves.

Given these procedural weapons the review board can become a decisive restraint on reckless congressional clamor for a wholesale purge. It can help

to take the issue of national security out of the dreary realm of partisan politics. It can give renewed courage to administrators who now defend the suspect at the risk of their own necks. And it can undermine the impression widely whispered in Government circles that an argument with the FBI (or Congress) is a form of administrative suicide. For while the FBI reports are deadpan and no recommendation is set forth, their existence periodically "leaks" in wondrous ways. Congressmen can demand them and congressional "sources" are often remarkably outspoken.

Simultaneously the standards set forth in the order must be painstakingly clarified. Actually the Civil Service Commission made substantial progress in this direction during the war. Its progress may be nullified by some of the loose language in the loyalty order. Back in March 1942 President Roosevelt issued war service regulations which held that one of the grounds for disqualification for a Federal employee was "the existence of a reasonable doubt of his loyalty to the Government of the United States." But "loyalty," as Professor Commager pointed out, has become a badly battered word. What we really mean is the existence of a competing allegiance so strong and clear that the person involved cannot be trusted inside a Government office.

This problem is enormously complicated by emergence of the "fellow traveler" as a classic political phenomenon of our times. As the Canadian spy revelations showed, the fellow traveler may in some instances be just a well-intentioned fellow whose thoughts have been traveling along paths parallel to Communist lines; he may, however, be a clandestine party member who, for reasons of safety, is spared the formality of signing a party card.

Because the Communists, like the Nazis, have leaned so heavily on men who lead political double lives, it is not enough to say that full proof of membership in the Communist Party must be shown before any dismissal can occur. Under this criteria some of the most elusive and important Communist operatives might escape, while the clumsiest and least significant were apprehended.

In an effort to resolve this difficulty the loyalty order invoked the dangerous doctrine of guilt by association. The Department of Justice is now preparing a list of "proscribed" organizations held to be Communist and Fascist fronts. The Attorney General, in response to protests, has indicated that at least some of these organizations will be given a hearing before he hands down his ruling. But that doesn't settle everything. The crucial question is the significance that will be attached to membership in one of the organizations listed.

Mr. Clark might hold with some justification that the Southern Conference for Human Welfare has been utilized as a front for the Communists. Does that mean that Dr. Frank Graham, who has bitterly fought the Communists for control of the conference but refused to abandon his membership in it, shall be barred from Government employment? The question suggests the possible absurdity of the standard.

Mr. Fleming has indicated a far more plausible approach. "An employee will be dismissed only if evidence of membership in such an organization, plus all the other evidence in the case, leads to the conclusion that reasonable grounds exist for believing that he is disloyal to the Government of the United States," he said recently. The order uses similar language, but it is later clouded by extensive reference to "association."

In effect Mr. Fleming is saying that the total pattern of behavior of the accused will be reviewed and a wide variety of human experience evaluated. Such subtleties are the qualities that distinguish reasonable inquiry from frenzied inquisition. Yet it should also be noted at this point that the Attorney General is given enormous "blacklist" authority, since membership in a front organization is the equivalent of at least one strike on the employee. Certainly the projected review board should have the right to make this final determination of "proscribed" groups, perhaps with the Attorney General occupying the role of prosecutor once he has reached his own decisions.

The recent dismissal of 10 State Department employees—without hearings or even recitation of charges—forcibly dramatized the need for the safeguards outlined here. It also underlined what is not generally appreciated—that State, the military departments, and the Atomic Energy Commission run their own purges and more than 500,000 employees are thus not currently covered by even the limited protections of the President's Executive order. State's arbitrary powers to fire (which the Department itself apparently reconsidered and modified in the case of the 10) derive from a congressional rider to its appropriation. The armed services invoke a wartime security statute. Atomic Energy similarly conducts its own security affairs by congressional sanction (or demand). There

is little justification for this separation. The guarantees that preserve integrity and imagination in Government are surely no less needed in the State Department than in agencies far removed from the diplomatic battlefield; and the same thing applies to the domain of the brass and braid.

There are some who contend that the whole loyalty program should be applied only to "sensitive" agencies, pointing out that the Labor Department or, let us say, the Fish and Wildlife Service would offer poor hunting ground for a foreign agent. Since military intelligence is primarily the art of correlating strangely diverse data, the argument is more entertaining than valid. Yet the review board might appropriately fix tighter standards for State, Atomic Energy, and the armed services than for clearly peripheral agencies. It could be plausibly argued that the burden of proof rests on the Government in a nonsecurity agency but that reasonable doubt would justify dismissal in the more strategic areas. It would also seem sensible to permit resignation without prejudice in any case short of an overt act.

In most of these matters the soundest course would be to let the review board draw these faint shadings rather than seek an advance blueprint.

III

The risks projected when police methods are applied to Government will not be dissipated overnight even if the proposed review board consists of 20 of our wisest Solomons. Perhaps the most serious threat is the least tangible—the possibility that men in Government will strive ostentatiously to conform; that the superpatrioteer will become a model public servant and the unorthodox mind will seek more congenial surroundings.

Dramatic and affirmative effort by the administration is plainly needed in view of the deepening demoralization in the Government service. The caliber of the men appointed to the review board will decisively affect this atmosphere. They must command sufficient respect to withstand a change in national administration. They must dwarf the professional "know-nothings" in Congress. I know that such men are being earnestly sought. Their appointment must be accompanied by an emphatic clarification of the language used in the loyalty order, a swift assertion of the powers they will invoke, and a revised statement of the objectives of the inquiry.

With such moves the Washington air could be freshened. The petty bureaucrats who view the loyalty probe as a chance to plant knives in the backs of competitors might be seriously discouraged; the citizen who wants to work for his Government would no longer feel he was helpless prey for invisible informers. The "know-nothings" would promptly charge that the administration was "softening" again; the Communists would cry that these are empty bourgeois gestures. But the instinctive decency of American opinion would be crystallized. The same Gallup polls that show widespread support for exclusion of Communists from Government also endorse full hearings for the accused.

The resilience of democratic society has repeatedly proved greater than the extreme right and extreme left have acknowledged. It faces a new test now. But on the basis of the evidence so far, the reports of democracy's death have once again been exaggerated. The loyalty program, despite a bad beginning, can still make sense.

EXHIBIT No. 28

[From the Labor Leader, August 25, 1952]

UNFORGIVABLE SIN

The dropping of Mr. James A. Wechsler, editor of the New York Post, from the TV political discussion panel, Starring the Editors, is based upon the fact that from 1934 to 1937 Mr. Wechsler was a member of the Young Communist League. This is a typical example of what can happen when someone commits the "unforgivable sin" of having his name spoken in the same breath with the word "Communists."

Mr. Wechsler has never denied or tried to conceal that he was a Young Communist Leaguer in his college days. But Mr. Wechsler is not a Communist today. Nor has he been since 1937. He has, indeed, been most outspoken against the Communist Party, and as editor of the liberal New York Post he has made full use of his position to expose and fight the Communists.

The action of the program sponsors, the Grand Union Supermarket chain stores, has been very arbitrary and un-American in their demand that Mr. Wechsler be taken off the panel. While we realize that any organization must be careful lest it find itself supporting Red activities, we can hardly say that there was any such question in the Wechsler case.

It is somewhat evident that the Grand Union was not interested in presenting to the TV audience a free panel discussion. Furthermore, any legitimate fear they may have entertained as to Mr. Wechsler's loyalty could have been eradicated by a quick glance at his editorials in the New York Post. But maybe that is asking too much.

The Grand Union, fearing that their cash registers will jingle a little less frequently, have deprived the TV audience of a viewpoint that they had a right to hear.

The Labor Leader deplors this un-American and un-Christian action of the Grand Union.

EXHIBIT No. 29

[From the Progressive, September 1948]

THE PHILADELPHIA PAYOFF

(By James A. Wechsler 1)

For Thomas E. Dewey and Harry Truman the campaign has just begun; for Henry A. Wallace the last miles of the long journey are at hand. Yet if the opinion polls are to be believed, Wallace's 8-month headstart has produced remarkably slender dividends. The latest figures suggest he will command about 3 million votes at the polls in November, which is approximately the strength he was conceded when he began his first cross-country pilgrimage last January. According to Dr. Gallup's findings, Wallace is almost the classic example of a man who stood still while running. The newest Roper poll shows him actually running backward. He was credited with 6.1 percent of the vote in April, only 3 percent in August.

This reporter has made almost every whistlestop with Wallace since the former Vice President proclaimed his candidacy. Whatever else these travels have proved, they have demonstrated once again that a candidate's campaign train (or plane) is probably the most deceptive point from which to obtain a view of a nominee's successes or failures. For inevitably one is surrounded by the adherents of the particular man who, and they create an illusion of numerical preponderance that may—or may not—have any relationship to reality.

This is especially pronounced in the case of a third party candidate because the emotional intensity of such a drive transcends the routines of a usual political expedition. The boys and girls all sound as if they are ready to die for dear old Rutgers and, momentarily at least, even the most cynical analyst is likely to forget that Notre Dame can put two experienced teams on the field if the going gets rough.

But there are uniquely baffling factors in the case of Wallace. Early in his campaign (perhaps in anticipation of gloomy arithmetical news) Wallace sought to discount the impact of the opinion polls. He said all prelection surveys would be meaningless since they would fail to measure the vast "hidden vote" of which he expects to be the beneficiary. As the Gallup surveys have continued to record signs of no progress along the Wallace route, and the Roper polls loss of supporters, these claims have become more strident. Some of Wallace's soberest associates have privately acknowledged their anxiety over the poll returns. They admit they had hoped for better things. Nevertheless, in unison with Wallace, they solemnly insist that the advance figures are deceptive.

For the benefit of impatient readers it should be stated here that there will be no prophecy at the end of this essay. Unquestionably the hidden-vote theory has some validity. The pressure against Wallace supporters in some communities is unmistakably intense. Moreover, there are other great imponderables such as the extent to which Wallace will rally a new vote in the southern territory which

¹ EDITOR'S NOTE.—James A. Wechsler, the Progressive's Washington correspondent, is back on the assignment which has already taken him 20,000 miles for the New York Post—covering Henry Wallace on his coast-to-coast campaign tour. The Wallace itinerary will take and keep Wechsler in the South for several weeks this month, and that's where his next article, for the October issue of the Progressive, will originate.

he is preparing to invade as this is written. Some observers believe the outpouring of Negro votes for Wallace will stun orthodox political commentators. The evidence on this point is far from conclusive now.

What does seem apparent, however, is the magnitude of the obstacles confronting the standard bearer of the newly named Progressive Party. In that context the proceedings of the new party convention at Philadelphia can only be regarded as one of the costliest expenditures of goodwill ever billed against an American nominee. That gathering met under the cloud created by charges of Communist control leveled against the Wallace movement. By the time the convention had ended the cloud was blacker than ever, and there was no trace of a rainbow in Wallace's political sky.

II

Wallace and his spokesmen have proclaimed with mounting anger in recent months that the American press is engaged in a studied conspiracy against the new party. They have bitterly decried what they call the "red smear." They have pointed out with outraged innocence to the Populist origins of Wallace's family progressivism, and they have deplored the attempt to identify him with the imported kind of Communist radicalism.

To anybody who has covered the Wallace hegira, the personal basis for this protest is indisputably sound. Wallace is neither a Communist nor a devout fellow traveler. With curious self-righteousness he boasts of his ignorance of Marxist machinations. He insists that he has never devised a formula for recognizing a Communist when he meets one on the street (or in his office) and scornfully derides the notion that he is the captive of any political cabal. I suspect these protestations are a strange blend of innocence and disingenuousness. It is often difficult to draw the line between the two characteristics.

Surely a man who has taken so many dogmatic stands on issues involving world communism weakens his prestige when he boasts—in another paragraph—that he doesn't know what he is talking about; which is exactly what Wallace has done on repeated occasions during his long campaign. Whenever he has been pressed to explain some of the more blatant Communist manifestations within his organization, he has assumed a look of bewilderment and pain, suggesting that discussion of such esoteric issues is beneath his political dignity. But at other times he has not hesitated to decry the administration's incompetence to deal with the Communist problem and to assert that his own presence in the White House would assure rational solutions. The inference would appear to be that only a man who really knows nothing about the subject can handle it effectively.

The meaning of these evasions may be debated for a long time. But the consequences of Wallace's alliance with the Communists were grimly demonstrated at Philadelphia. It is not surprising that he and his cohorts have been more truculent than ever before in condemning the covering of his convention as part of the great plot against Wallace. For the barest truth was intrinsically uncharitable.

The details of the convention have been painfully recorded in many places. A few salient facts summarize the story. Long before the sessions got underway its character had been dictated by a few strategic decisions at Wallace headquarters.

Representative Vito Marcantonio, who has never deviated from the Communist line during his fiery career on Capitol Hill, was named chairman of the rules committee.

Lee Pressman, the onetime CIO general counsel, who has never denied published assertions that he is a veteran member of the Communist Party, was designated secretary of the platform committee. (When Pressman was again identified during recent congressional hearings as a key Communist operative, he cried out angrily that Henry Wallace was being smeared, but he neglected to state whether the charges against Lee Pressman were true or false.)

John Abt, who hovered about the convention platform from start to finish, like a preoccupied stage manager on opening night, has been similarly reticent to challenge sworn testimony that he is an influential Communist performer.

Just who selected Marcantonio, Pressman, and Abt for their posts of responsibility at the third party convention is not known to this correspondent. Several months ago, shortly after the announcement that Pressman would act as secretary of the platform committee, I asked Wallace what he thought of the selection. He replied that he did not know it had occurred. But he swiftly added that he had not seen any evidence proving Pressman's political affiliations. Then he proceeded to discuss other things.

Without rehearsing all the gory details, it can be stated categorically that the Marcantonio-Pressman-Abt combine ran things as it pleased. Dissenters were handled with professional roughness by Albert J. Fitzgerald, the pink-cheeked president of the electrical workers union who has been taking orders from the Communists so long that his reflexes are automatic.

The crudity of the performance was slightly staggering. The Rules Committee, for example, came up with the astonishing proposal (accepted without much argument) that decisions may be reached by the national committee even if no majority quorum is physically present. Proxies are an old leftwing device to maintain minority rule. At the same time a provision, valiantly but unsuccessfully resisted by Maryland and a few other delegations, insured topheavy representation for the big industrial States on the national body. The States, of course, are those where the Communists most completely and rigidly control the machinery of the new party.

III

But the platform reflected even more precisely the fabulous fluctuations of the Communist line. Consider the most absurd example: In the draft platform presented to the convention there was a familiar declaration of support for the Macedonian quest for national freedom and independence. This is an old Communist war cry, and in past conclaves of the leftwing Elks it has never occasioned dispute. But between the time that Pressman wrote the preliminary platform draft, which he pulled out of his pocket when the platform committee assembled, and by the time the convention got under way, the Macedonians had indicated they might turn to Tito for spiritual guidance. In the same interval Tito had slid into the Communist doghouse because of his bad manners in relations with the Russian hierarchy.

Apparently some distinguished Communist theologian grasped this point at the 11th hour. As a result, the Macedonians were unceremoniously stricken from the mimeographed platform when it was presented to the delegates.

This might have gone virtually unnoticed except that an unreconstructible progressive from Minnesota demanded an explanation. He was still pro-Macedonian. Fitzgerald, who is loyal to the party but not very learned in international affairs, turned helplessly to Dr. Rexford G. Tugwell, who had valiantly presided over the platform committee and suppressed his own liberal deviations out of devotion to the common good and welfare. Tugwell, visibly embarrassed by the episode, turned to Pressman; and even Pressman seemed suddenly stricken mute, which rarely happens to the belligerent barrister. All three appealed to Louis Adamic to render the explanation. Mr. Adamic then delivered an address which more closely approximated gibberish than any political sermon I have ever heard. It was generously suggested at the press table that he was deliberately coining doubletalk to ease the tension. If Michael Barnaby Wechsler (approaching the age of 6) were guilty of an equivalent degree of what we call "goofy nonsense," he would be deprived of his supper in even these libertarian precincts. Anyway, as Adamic finished his recital, another reporter learned over and remarked:

"What in God's name are these Wallace people trying to do—hang themselves?"

I did not know the answer and I suggest that those of you who are morbidly interested write Wallace headquarters for the text of Mr. Adamic's tirade. It may have been translated by now.

IV

All this occurred on the closing day of the convention, and I thought we had seen everything. But in late afternoon, as the convention neared adoption of the foreign-policy statement, a delegate from Vermont rose in support of a brief amendment. He pointed out that the Progressive Party plank was crowded with denunciation of American foreign policy but that it lacked any criticism of Soviet policy. He voiced what sounded like rational concern over the possibility that this emphasis would be misunderstood. (The Marshall plan had already been condemned without debate.) Therefore, he proposed that the convention adopt a cryptic, unprovocative amendment to this effect: "It is not our intention to give blanket endorsement to the foreign policy of any nation."

To the undialectical, backward boys in the press box this amendment appeared to be a gentle enough request, and the ensuing tumult was slightly bewildering. In rapid succession a series of Communist and pro-Communist dignitaries rose to announce that they were shocked by these words. "They will be interpreted

as an insinuation against a foreign ally," one speaker cried, and I quote him directly. From his remarks I deduced that any intimation that the convention did not embrace the Soviet line on all matters, Macedonian and otherwise, was an intolerable heresy. On the platform the unhappy Dr. Tugwell looked grimly at the unyielding Mr. Pressman, who now stood up to explain (in an address imitating the rhetorical tradition set by Mr. Adamic) that he felt the platform, without further adornment, proved the new party's independence of judgment. So the Vermont rebels—at least one of whom has subsequently retired from the new party—were ruthlessly battered into defeat while veteran newspapermen looked on in mingled disbelief and awe.

During all these events Mr. Wallace was not in the hall. I assume that he was in his hotel room, listening to the bleak business, but there is no record that he made any effort to intervene.

There were many phases of the new party convention that could be readily lampooned, but few men derived any real joy from that effort. For there was (as has been widely reported) a quality of unmistakable seriousness, occasionally bordering on hysteria, in the atmosphere. There were many decent, generous, and well-intentioned men and women on the scene, groping desperately for a political resurgence. There were people who had no love for the well-disciplined, purposeful Communist array but who honestly believed that a new political movement had to be launched regardless of the character of some of the participants. There were a lot of young boys and girls who obviously felt that Philadelphia was a big crossroads on the way to a better world.

In the light of what actually happened, behind the scenes and on the stage at the new party convention, these qualities of zeal and devotion seem to me more heartbreaking than heroic. It is not pleasant to watch the misuse of valuable human material and the corruption of lofty instincts. Nor does the intensity of the rank-and-file emotion prove anything about the validity of the enterprise; without laboring the analogy, it is worth recalling that some of the most ardent and selfless young people of our generation were the stalwarts of the Nazi youth movement. They were passionately wrong, and their fervor led them up the darkest blind alley of our century. So when some of the middle-aged ladies at the Wallace party convention pointed with pride at the frenzied youths, this reporter managed to restrain his enthusiasm. In some ways I would have preferred to see them pulling down the goalposts after a big game.

V

Against that background Wallace starts the final phase of his campaign. Some of the independents in his party admit their nervousness over the Communist bloc. They know it has injured the party's prestige. They realize that the convention dramatized the degree of Communist rule. But most of them know that it is too late to start over.

When Wallace undertook the third-party effort without the support of any non-Communist wing of the labor movement, he placed himself at the mercy of the Communist machine. It was the only working group which could build the new party organization; it would work overtime. But it is also exacting its price, and the Philadelphia payoff was exorbitant.

Wallace enters the last phase of his campaign in the unhappy position of a nominee who must pretend that his national convention never happened, or that he really had no connection with the events that occurred there. But there is a strong possibility that he lost a good deal more than the Macedonian vote when the Communist faithful decided to show their hand at the new party convention.

EXHIBIT No. 30

[From the New York Post, June 28, 1950]

THE WORLD'S BEST HOPE

In 1931 the Japanese invaded Manchuria and—although few men perceived it at the time—the pattern of aggression for a decade was set. In each successive crisis the story was always the same; in Ethiopia and in the Rhineland, in Spain and Czechoslovakia tyranny advanced triumphantly while the free world wept and wavered. The League of Nations died in the hands of men who lacked the capacity or the will to act; with its death went the hope of peace.

All that is worth recalling now in the light of yesterday's dramatic events. To recognize risk in the course proclaimed by President Truman is to concede the obvious. The world is a dangerous place and there are no easy highways to security. The question is not whether action involves risk; it is whether the ultimate peril would be smaller if South Korea fell to the Communist armies while we hopelessly turned our eyes away.

In our judgment, there is only one answer. We could not buy peace by appeasement in the Nazi era and we cannot buy it by surrender now. Communist aggression in Korea was a test of democratic nerve. It was also a life-and-death challenge to the United Nations. It could not be evaded without inviting new aggression, whether in Yugoslavia or some other explosive spot. In the hours preceding the President's announcement Communists in Western Europe had prematurely begun to cite South Korea's "defeat" as a warning to others who try to combat the Kremlin wave of the future. If there is any hope of achieving world order in our century, resistance in South Korea may prove as crucial now as resistance in Manchuria would have been 20 years ago.

* * *

No human being can avoid a sense of anxiety and dread at the news that American bombers are in the air over Korea, manned by American pilots. We are tragically reminded of our failure to achieve peace through two world wars. Men may gloomily wonder again whether they will ever live to see real peace on earth. Yet the historic fact is that our planes fly now as emissaries of the United Nations, translating into reality the dream of collective security which has stirred our generation. Some may dismiss as empty formality the proceedings at Lake Success yesterday; the decision, it will be pointed out, ratified an accomplished fact, whether because of an ill-timed "leak" from MacArthur's headquarters or a belief that hours were vital on the Korean fighting front. Yet those who miss the moral symbolism miss the one great hope. We did seek and obtain the sanction of mankind's tribunal—the U. N. We are acting as members of a community of nations. We are contributing our resources to carry out a solemn declaration of the United Nations in that agency's most desperate hour. All that is something new under the sun.

These are the things the United States must say clearly now. The Voice of America is as important as the Air Force at this moment. Moscow will use our act to camouflage the aggression that provoked this crisis. We urge the President to give the world our answer in terms that can be understood everywhere. Bombs alone should not speak for America.

* * *

The confusionists are busy. On the pro-Communist left there is the usual loss of contact with reality. The world turns upside down and the aggressors overnight become "the liberators." The isolationist Chicago Tribune and the Daily Worker join hands again as they have done so often; both declare war on Mr. Truman. We believe most Americans will support him, with heavy heart but high hope. For if aggression can be halted in Korea, if the U. N.'s words can become international law, if the despots are finally convinced that free men will not wait and wonder as they did in Hitler's heyday, there is hope that we may yet glimpse peace in our age.

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

No. 1

[From the New York Post, June 7, 1949]

WRONG YEAR

Speaking of boredom reminds us that Elizabeth T. Bentley is still at work. The Associated Press and its rivals have once again crowded their wires with new, improved and undocumented allegations from the lady known as Liz. She has belatedly remembered the names of six more government employees who, in the detached words of the AP report, acted as "information suppliers for the Soviet government." Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee have inserted Miss Bentley's afterthoughts in the committee records, thus giving her (and the wire services) immunity from libel suits.

Her words ought to be examined carefully before they are treated as serious prose. Recently Miss Bentley told the Senate group that she knew of the 1942 Doolittle raid on Tokyo "a week or two ahead of time" and transmitted the dope to her Soviet masters. According to a Washington dispatch, "she said she got the information from William L. Ullman, then in the Army Air Force."

Wuxtry, zounds and stop the presses. But having closely followed Miss Bentley's curious crusade against William Remington, who was ultimately cleared by a loyalty board composed of three Republicans, we restrained ourselves. We dug back into the records of the House Un-American Activities Committee. We found the sworn testimony of William Ullman which revealed that he was drafted in 1942, served as an enlisted man until January, 1943, was then admitted to Officers Training School and graduated in April 1943. He was not assigned to the Pentagon until that time—exactly one year after the Doolittle raid occurred.

We have been trying to get Miss Bentley to explain this baffling discrepancy but she hangs up petulantly when she hear our voice.

No. 2

[From the New York Post, June 23, 1949]

HOOVERISM

FBI Director John Edgar Hoover has found the heat oppressive in recent days; it has been probably the roughest interval in the G-man's career. For the first time since he achieved bipartisan national stature equaled only by Babe Ruth in his greater years, Hoover is the target of sharp and searching attack from eminently non-Communist sources. This is a new and painful ordeal for the FBI chief, and a good thing for the U. S. A.

The changed atmosphere is largely a result of Judge Albert O. Reeves' ruling forcing the Justice Dept. to produce confidential FBI files mentioned in the prosecution of Judith Coplon. Reeves' move may be remembered as a lasting public service. For the dossiers contained (as we have long suspected) unverified gossip, irrelevant hints, and unpursued tips. They revealed that the techniques of political inquiry used by the FBI are infinitely less precise and sophisticated than Hoover's admirers have pretended. It is no answer to say that the material was never evaluated by the FBI or that the files were never designed for public reading. Too many FBI reports have leaked in the past; too many of them clearly embody information that should have been proved or scrapped; the mere existence of a dossier is an implied judgment that the individual is a suspicious character. Now that the sample contents have been published, the FBI is exposed to the kind of satiric spoofing embodied in the mythical dossier on J. Edgar Hoover released by Americans for Democratic Action today. We

trust that none of Hoover's aides will try to prove that ADA (which bars Communists from membership) is writing Russian jokes.

Immediately after the FBI files were released at the Coplon trial, rumors of Hoover's impending resignation deluged the country. The story spread that the FBI director had resisted the move and had been overruled by President Truman or Attorney General Clark, or both; and it was authoritatively reported that he planned to retire to private life or detection. These dispatches, which did not read like spontaneous journalistic combustion, immediately provoked an editorial campaign warning that Hoover's departure would leave the Republic defenseless against Soviet agents.

But as the monuments to Hoover were being erected in the public squares, a strange and unparalleled thing occurred. According to past protocol, President Truman was supposed to fall to his knees, issue a 3,000-word tribute to the grandest G-man of them all and implore him to remain in office, parenthetically noting that democracy's survival hinged on an affirmative reply. None of these things happened. Mr. Truman temperately conceded that Hoover has performed his work satisfactorily; he refused, however, to send any flowers and his reticence was duly noted. Then an increasing number of newspapers (standing somewhere to the right of center) published sober, forthright, and unenthusiastic evaluations of the FBI's political performance.

And after all these unusual events Hoover is still on the job, thereby confounding the correspondents who performed services above and beyond call of duty in what they thought was his hour of need.

We do not mean to overstate the historic quality of this development. In many areas Hoover still enjoys a special status accorded no other government servant, corporate president, or opera singer. But his immunity is fading. It may be possible in our lifetime to write and talk about him as if he were a usual mortal working for the government; and he may be finally persuaded that his detractors are not—by definition—NKVD operatives.

Obviously J. Edgar Hoover is neither a fascist nor a national hero; he is a fallible official entrusted with enormous and even frightening powers. The crucial point is that he has no right to assume that he ranks slightly above the commander in chief in the American chain of command. If Mr. Truman has established that point, he will have succeeded in an experiment which not even Franklin D. Roosevelt ever tried.

No. 3

[From the New York Post, June 30, 1949]

WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE . . . FOR SOME

We are sure this republic can survive without government issuance of a "subversive" list. The Justice Department's inclusion of organizations on that list without even the formality of a hearing renders the whole business even more intolerable. We intend to keep on saying so until Attorney General Clark abandons the practice. The procedure invites unfair, high-handed decree. It is also superfluous. For Communist-front organizations have long ago mastered the art of exposing themselves.

The so-called Civil Rights Congress, which held a pep-rally in Madison Square Garden the other evening, dramatically illustrates the point. At the Garden a long succession of speakers orated tumultuously on real and imaginary threats to U. S. civil liberties. They decried persecution and prosecution of Communists, they invoked the names of Jefferson, Lincoln and Roosevelt, and they pretended to speak for the great libertarian American tradition.

But the show had been given away before the doors of the Garden opened. Last weekend the New York State division of the Civil Rights Congress held a conference to approve all the current resolutions in the current Communist book. Things were proceeding with militant monotony until an unexpected interruption occurred. A member of the Socialist Workers Party (whose members regard Trotsky rather than Stalin as the true revolutionary prophet) got up and urged the conference to condemn the wartime prosecution of leading Trotskyites and the "disloyalty" ouster of James Katcher from his Veterans' Administration post. The proposal offered a true test of the Congress' devotion to the cause of unpopular minorities. The Trotskyites were prosecuted under the Smith act—the same dangerous and oppressive law under which the Communist leaders are now being tried and which the Civil Rights Congress deplors (when it is applied to the

Communists). Kutcher was fired under the loose, catch-all language of the loyalty program which the Civil Rights Congress condemns.

But Communists hate Trotskyites more than any other form of contemporary humanity and Communists do not believe in civil liberties for those whom they dislike. So the delegates to the Civil Rights assemblage voted to reject the proposed resolution. Their deliberations ended with fiery denunciations of all curbs on the civil rights of Communists and stolid silence on the subject of Trotskyite freedom. The episode must have been both painful and revealing for any non-Communists who found themselves in the hall on the mistaken assumption that the meeting was dedicated to the preservation of liberty for all.

Such performances render formal government identification of the Civil Rights Congress as unnecessary as it is unwise. They also remind us that liberals who believe in the defense of political minorities, regardless of ideological purity, can join the American Civil Liberties Union, which stands for freedom without doubletalk.

No. 4

[From the New York Post, August 23, 1949]

TRIAL BY BOREDOM

The trial of the Communist leaders is in its 32d week and most of the country would probably be relieved if the game were called because of boredom. Despite all the courtroom posturing of the defendants, the shrill antics of defense counsel, the plodding persistence of the Justice Dept. prosecutors and the ill-concealed agony of Justice Medina, the trial has never achieved a great moment.

There are, we suspect, two reasons for the hollowness of the drama. One is a widely shared belief that the engagement is a sham battle; it is difficult to believe that the Supreme Court would sustain a conviction. The defendants are being prosecuted under the ill-conceived Smith Act for advocacy of ideas; however obnoxious these ideas, the high tribunal is unlikely to abandon the view that acts, rather than beliefs, should be subject to prosecution—and with the further qualification imposed by the "clear-and-present-danger" test. If the government succeeds in convicting the Communist bigwigs, it may merely set the stage for a Supreme Court ruling that the Smith Act is unconstitutional.

It all adds up to the fact that the Justice Dept. is accusing the Communist leaders of conspiring to spread a thought and there is happily little enthusiasm in the land for this effort. Justice Sherbow's rejection of Maryland's antisubversive statute indicates the direction of the judicial winds. He once again affirmed our opposition to the policing of ideas. His opinion suggested that judges can be unmoved by momentary civic passions and we have heard no cries for his head since his decision was handed down.

The nature of the current prosecution makes the Communist trial dreary enough, but the defendants, in their attempts to imitate Dimitrov at the Reichstag fire trial, have accentuated the listlessness of the courtroom. Their self-inflicted martyrdom in skirmishes with Judge Medina has the quality of school-boy rowdyism; one expects them to start hurling spitballs at the bench when Medina seems to be napping. They recite the grim clichés of the party texts and they intone slogans as if addressing unseen audiences. As they strive with mock-heroic futility to read coherence into the shifting course of the Communist line, their speeches are always shadowed by our knowledge that a new twist in Soviet policy would force them to revise the record. Watching this show, most Americans can't picture the defendants as major threats to American security; whatever services they render the Soviet foreign office, their jargon divides them irrevocably from the country in which they are laboring. They may confuse, divide, and irritate. They may prepare for sabotage in time of war. But none of their real offenses is being unveiled in the pedantic proceedings at Foley Square. The truth is that the U. S. Communist chieftains will tear up all Marxist texts and burn all the Leninist books if Moscow decrees such a course. Their peacetime impotence is finally dramatized by their inability to exploit the bungling prosecution. The martyrs are sad sacks and the trial is a turkey.

No. 5

[From the New York Post, October 16, 1949]

WHO WON?

*"But what good came of it at last?"**Quoth little Peterkin,**"Why, that I cannot tell," said he:**"But 'twas a famous victory."*

—Robert Southey's "Battle of Blenheim."

* * *

Conviction of eleven top Communist leaders for conspiring to advocate the violent overthrow of the U. S. government is a dreary climax to the dull and interminable drama of Foley Square. Technically the Justice Department is triumphant, pending review of the verdict by the Supreme Court. In a deeper sense this was a case the United States could not win, regardless of the jury's action. If the defendants had been acquitted they would undoubtedly have claimed that "mass indignation" had dictated the result. They would have heralded the verdict as proof of their fundamental innocence and as vindication of their long service to the Kremlin.

The verdict of guilty will be even more useful to them. The Communist high command will continue to revel in the carefully manufactured martyrdom it has enjoyed since the prosecution began. It will raise additional funds, form new committees, issue new manifestoes and hold coast-to-coast pep-rallies. Given the alternatives, we suspect that the trial turned out exactly as the Communist chieftains had hoped. The Cominform's passion plays are invariably most successful when the endings are unhappy. What better weapon could the Communists find to blanket the terror in Prague than this synthetic shocker in Manhattan? How many millions throughout the world will fail to note that the defendants were not hurled into the tumbril and that their fate is unsettled until the Supreme Court reviews their appeal?

* * *

The Communist leaders were tried under the provisions of the Smith Act, an ill-conceived and sweeping statute which prohibits conspiratorial advocacy of revolutionary thoughts. Thus far the high tribunal has not evaluated the constitutionality of the act. Ironically, when it was invoked against the Trotskyites in 1942 and against a profascist network in 1943, the Communists ardently supported application of the statute. Under the loose language of the law, the jury's verdict in the Communist case may well have been inevitable. That is a nice point; lawyers will debate it for years. Our own belief is that there is no systematic body of doctrine which the Communists consistently espouse—in public or private. They follow each fluctuation in the line of the Russian foreign office. They dream of insurrection in the "bourgeois democracies" when Russia is hostile to the west; they would once again become fervent patriots if a Soviet reconciliation with the west were fashioned.

To attribute any deep and unshakable ideals to the Communist leaders is to flatter them and give them an authentic place in the American radical tradition. In fact, as they have repeatedly demonstrated, they are primarily agents of Kremlin policy no less than the Bund leaders were servants of Hitler's Reich.

But they were not prosecuted as unregistered foreign agents. They were found guilty of a conspiracy to preach and teach revolutionary doctrine. No overt acts were alleged, no secret arsenals exposed. Judge Medina in effect maintained in his charge to the jury that the Smith statute waived the historic "clear and present danger" test; all that the prosecution had to show, he contended, was secret education for revolution at the first feasible moment. It was the crucial emphasis on advocacy that dominated the trial and gave the defendants the chance to picture themselves as the victims of a heresy hunt. By prosecuting them on this elusive ground, the Government gave false dignity to the Communist rulers and obscured the true nature of Communist loyalty, which is to a foreign capital rather than a revolutionary cause.

We think the Supreme Court will ultimately reject the Smith Act as unconstitutional. We believe it will affirm the validity of the historic Holmes doctrine that advocacy of ideas cannot be punished unless there is an imminent threat to

the survival of the republic. At no point did the prosecution suggest that the Communists are capable of engineering an antidemocratic coup in the United States of America within the foreseeable future. The tragedy is that the world may misread the prosecution and the verdict as an admission that we seriously fear such an uprising is at hand.

Little, if anything, has been gained by the folly of Foley Square; much has been lost. Freedom is our fighting faith in a world once again shadowed by a totalitarian mob. The Communist trial will be interpreted as a sign that our jitters have weakened our faith. We have adequate laws to combat Communist espionage and sabotage; in the realm of ideas we should welcome direct combat. It is no answer to say that the Communists do not really care about freedom and that they invoke the Bill of Rights only in their own behalf. That is elementary. But democracy has a better case than the dubious claim that the Communists are neither nobler nor more tolerant than we are. In the "peoples' democracies," freedom is a luxury reserved for those who conform to the Cominform; in a genuine democracy, freedom means maximum liberty for the expression of ideas we loathe.

The verdict will provoke know-nothing demands for a general roundup of Communists and the launching of new prosecutions. It would be catastrophic if the Administration yielded to this pressure. J. Edgar Hoover has often asserted that we gain nothing by driving the Communists underground. We have already maneuvered ourselves into a futile corner. We have given the divided and disintegrating United States Communist movement a new lease on public life. We have hardened the allegiance of wavering spirits within Communist ranks. We have reanimated the faltering fellow travelers. The course of wisdom now is to regain our composure, rebuild our democratic fences and await the ruling of the Supreme Court.

No. 6

[From the New York Post, October 24, 1949]

HOW MARTYRS ARE MADE

There is surface consistency in Judge Medina's refusal to release the 11 convicted Communist chieftains pending their appeal to higher courts. The government's case must ultimately rest on the theory that they are dangerous men spreading ideas that menace the republic; to free them now would caricature the government's argument, the jury's verdict, and the judge's sentence. But if that is the logic of the moment, it also dramatizes the futility of the law under which they were prosecuted. For we are convinced that the inept, discredited Communist leaders are infinitely more dangerous as imprisoned symbols than they were as public parrots of Kremlin foreign policy.

We still believe reasonable men will find that the Communist Party offers no real revolutionary threat in the foreseeable future; it is a battered band, hopelessly alien in allegiance, deprived of any authentic roots in the labor movement, cut off from the mainstream of American life by a long record of faithful service to Moscow. It has desperately needed a homespun issue to cloak its role of slavish servitude to a foreign capital. To some degree the trial, involving as it did serious questions of civil liberty, provided such an issue; the conviction perpetuated it; and the imprisonments heighten the melodrama of martyrdom.

We reiterate our belief that Communist ideas, shifting as they do with each fluctuation in Soviet policy, offer no terrifying menace to democratic society. Communist espionage and sabotage can be combated under existing laws; by pursuing the application of the Smith act to its distorted climax, we have made the Communist leaders seem far more formidable fellows than they were before their unpersuasive soap-box sermons were interrupted.

The paradox of Foley Square is that we may be giving substance to a nightmare.

No. 7

[From the New York Post, August 30, 1950]

"OH, MOTHER!"

Actress Jean Muir has been banished from the cast of the television soap opera known as *The Aldrich Family* and no doubt some simple souls somewhere

believe this is a great day for democracy. We don't. We don't believe either America or The Aldrich Family is improved by the rough deal Miss Muir has gotten as a result of pressure applied by private agencies trying to perform the business of the FBI.

Miss Muir is neither a Communist nor a fellow traveler. At worst she is accused of having allowed her name to be used in times long past by organizations subsequently branded subversive by the Justice Dept. Yet, largely because of a citation in the records of a private organization known as "Counter Attack," she is being exiled from television and denied a chance to earn a living. Counter Attack is a "confidential" commercial newsletter issued by two former FBI agents. Obviously there would be no need for Counter Attack—and no sense in subscribing to it—if its editors conceded that the U. S. Communist movement is divided, demoralized, and disintegrating. They have an investment in spreading the word that Communists are streaming into our homes via television and other methods. Their identifications are often accurate, if well known. But, as in the case of Miss Muir, they are not prone to give a victim a break. A lot of Jean Muirs are needed to prove the necessity for Counter Attack's existence, especially on a day when Lee Pressman is confessing and in the month that Henry Wallace left the crumbling Progressive Party.

Well, the editors of Counter Attack have a right to earn a living. But their business becomes the concern of all of us when their files determine who shall—and shall not—appear on television programs. We don't need private detective agencies powerful enough to tell American corporations who is fit to be Henry Aldrich's mother. Neither do we need high-pressure campaigns to save us from the televised appearance of an actress whose name allegedly got on a list a decade ago. The exclusion of Miss Muir from television doesn't make life one bit softer for the embattled GIs in Korea. It plays directly into the hands of the Communists who cry that our democracy is frightened and foolish. It in no way hampers the operations of secret Communist operatives who never make public appearances with either Henry Aldrich or Hopalong Cassidy. When anyone gets the treatment Jean Muir has received all the poisons which Communists spread about the frailty of free institutions gain new virulence. That's how subversives are made. As Henry Aldrich would say: "Oh, Mother!"

No. 8

[From the New York Post, March 6, 1951]

NO QUESTIONS ASKED

The FBI is staging its annual appropriation campaign and every other government agency must watch the show with mingled awe and bitterness. Whatever happens to anybody else's appropriation, J. Edgar Hoover's G-men never lose. As the fortunes of the Communist Party fade and the circulation of the Daily Worker drops to 14,000, the FBI's war-chest to combat subversion mounts. This may seem illogical but the FBI's script writers are imaginative men.

In 1947 their task was easier. They could proclaim that there were still 74,000 dues-paying Communists, a figure which Hoover dramatically described as a higher percentage of Bolsheviks than Russia had in 1917. He got his appropriation. Last year the scenario had to be revised. Even the most innocent Congressman could sense that the American Communists were a declining breed. All their fronts were collapsing, most of their heroes becoming villains. But Hoover was grimmer than ever. The Times headline describing his plea for money said: "U. S. Reds Go Underground to Foil FBI, Hoover Says." He got what he asked for. Now once again the FBI is asking for an increased budget, though the Communists have suffered new disintegration. Their defense of aggression in Korea has riddled their fronts and exposed their rear; they have lost the friendship of such stars as Henry Wallace. But the FBI is unmoved by these surface manifestations of Communist decay. This year the Times headline reads: "Reds Hide Deeper, FBI Chief Warns." Accompanying that disclosure is another plea for more money to pursue them beneath the earth's surface.

Conceivably all these increases are warranted. We will never be sure because there will never be any real public debate on the issue; even the most rabid economizers on Capitol Hill will bow reverently and contribute gladly as Hoover passes the hat. In 1939 the agency's budget was a modest \$6,000,000; by 1950 it had reached \$58,000,000 and this year it is asking for an additional \$26,000,000.

Admittedly the FBI's scope of operations has substantially widened in the last decade. But where does it all end? If the Communists show new evidence of public strength, the FBI will ask for more funds; if they vanish from the American landscape, Hoover will need more money to dig them out of the soil. The less menacing they seem, the more mysterious they become; the deader they are, the livelier the man-hunt.

The great absurdity lies on Capitol Hill. Hoover says the McCarran Act is partially responsible for the Communist descent to lower depths. That is why it is more expensive to police them. Sen. McCarran nods sagely as Hoover speaks. But neither offers the obvious solution to the dilemma: repeal the act, let the Muscovites emerge from hiding and save the government the cost of searching the catacombs. Perhaps that is too simple. The G-men may not always get their man but they always get their appropriation.

No. 9

[From the New York Post, March 7, 1951]

CIRCUS NEWS

The House Un-American Activities Committee is reopening investigation of subversion in Hollywood. Don't forget to bring the kiddies.

No. 10

[From the New York Post, May 31, 1951]

GRAVEYARD FOLLIES

In the last article of a series on Hollywood, William Randolph Hearst's Daily Mirror reports today that "Hollywood Communism is a battered, beaten wreck, its influence dead, its members scattered." We agree; we think that has been true for many months. And that being true, this fascinating question remains: why is the House Un-American Activities Committee wasting manpower, money, and energy solemnly investigating, denouncing, and exposing a corpse?

No. 11

[From the New York Post, June 21, 1951]

FROM THOMAS JEFFERSON TO J. HOWARD MCGRATH

"If there be any among us who wish to dissolve this Union, or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed, as monuments to the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it."

The words are Thomas Jefferson's; they are as noble as they were the day he delivered them. They are far more inspiring words than any of the prose published by the Justice Dept. yesterday. But let it be known that Attorney General McGrath has once more told off Tom Jefferson in no uncertain terms.

For McGrath rides again. Emboldened by the Supreme Courts' decision in the Smith Act case, he has now rounded up the Communist "second team"; the Foley Square Follies will reopen soon. At a moment when we should be advertising our freedoms to the world, we are once again proclaiming our fears. The script was not inspiring the first time and there is no indication that it will improve with age. Once again the Communists will be hauled into court, not for overt acts of espionage or sabotage, not for failure to register their palpable allegiance to a foreign power, but for the *advocacy* of revolutionary ideas. And by placing them in court we dignify their ideas and discredit the most magnificent document we own, which is known as the Bill of Rights.

Scorecard.—We are fascinated in a grim way by what is solemnly called the Justice Dept.'s strategy. The Communist "first team" has already been convicted; now the second platoon is to be placed on trial and, unless the Supreme Court begins to recognize the wisdom of its two wise dissenters, the third-string will soon be rounded up. If there were even any strategic validity to this procedure, it would have to be based on the notion that leaders of the Communist Party are men of unusual distinction and that the party's propaganda efforts will somehow be destroyed if these great voices are muted. But the dreary victims

hardly live up to this description. Frankly, we fail to detect any big difference between the talents of the inept first and second teams; the fellows way down on the fifth squad many finally prove more formidable than the starting lineup.

The comic and futile quality of the headline-hunt was further underlined by McGrath's stirring tribute to his aides in the Justice Dept. and the FBI for their ability to identify the Communist second team. This was great detective work indeed, except that the names and numbers of all the players had been printed day after day in the Communist Daily Worker for many weeks.

Frightened men.—We have said before that the fate of a handful of Communist leaders is not the issue. We know what they would like to do to our free institutions. We know how cynically they have defended the ruthless Stalinist despotisms in other lands. We know that in any society which they ruled no man would be free. If we believed that this fanatic band of Soviet apologists could conceivably take over the U. S. A., we would favor drastic action against all of them. But anyone who knows anything about America knows the absurdity of this nightmare. Does anyone seriously believe this republic is too weak to withstand the propaganda of the Communists? Does anyone seriously argue that the mere *advocacy* of Communist ideas carries the threat of ultimate democratic destruction? Only paranoids harbor those terrors.

It is true, in the words of Justice Holmes, that no man has a moral right to shout "fire" in a crowded theater. But if the man who shouts it is known to one and all as the village idiot (and has been vainly shouting for 20 years), it can hardly be said that his cry will create panic. That is the position of the Communists in America—time and again exposed and routed in the free market place of opinion, known to one and all as mouthpieces of the Soviet foreign office, always losing recruits faster than they gain them.

What they can accomplish by promoting their American translations of Joe Stalin's opinions hardly seems a major menace. The damage we can create by staging repeated prosecutions directed at the thoughts men think and the words they speak is a far graver matter. The U. S. Communists have dismally failed in their crusade against our democracy. The danger lies in what they incite us to do to democracy ourselves. Frightened men are foolish men.

Some excerpts from the new indictment painfully dramatize the grotesqueness of the proceeding: "*In further pursuance of the said conspiracy . . . William Weinstone did issue a directive concerning teaching of Marxism-Leninism and cause it to be circulated . . . Marion Bachrach did write and caused to be published a pamphlet . . . Louis Weinstock did teach at the Jefferson School of Social Science.*" It all reads like a burlesque of heresy-hunting, but the joke is on democracy.

The Attorney General is smug and triumphant. In his new moment of triumph let him remember that Stalin's most dangerous agents—the underground operatives plotting sabotage and espionage—do not make stump speeches or serve on central committees; atom-spy Harry Gold testified that he was specifically admonished by his superiors in the Soviet network to stay away from local Communist functions. Justice Dept. agents who are valiantly studying the collected writings of Lenin, Stalin, and William Z. Foster to prepare the new case against their disciples might be far more usefully engaged in real counter-espionage. That, of course, would be real work without benefit of headlines.

Voice of America.—The times are full of tension. The external Soviet threat to democracy is unrelenting and free men dare not minimize that danger. All our vision and greatness as a nation will be required to meet it without wrecking the freedoms which make democracy worth all the fighting and dying.

It is easy to imitate the enemy. But in the long run we believe the citizens of this republic—and freemen everywhere—will come to revere Justices Black and Douglas and others like them who refused to join the stampede.

When an argument breaks out in the bleachers there is always an anonymous man who keeps yelling: "Let the guy talk, will ya, it's a free country."

We think he still speaks for America.

No. 12

[From the New York Post, July 27, 1951]

LITTLE MEN BILLED AS BIG MENACES

We have been unjust to J. Edgar Hoover and/or Louella Parsons. We scoffed the other day when Louella revealed that J. Edgar had told her he was in Holly-

wood on serious business; yet it now seems clear that he really wanted her to be the first to know. For while poor Louis Sobol was reporting from Hollywood yesterday that he had just seen Hoover at the local racetrack, FBI agents were busily at work in the vicinity, thereby confirming Louella's exclusive prophecy of two days earlier.

The result of these latest FBI labors is the newest roundup of Communist functionaries, most of them so unheralded in the party's setup that they surely didn't anticipate such early recognition and probably never dreamed they would one day be identified as dangerous thinkers. The new arrests, of course, were ordered by Attorney General McGrath who seems determined to invoke the toughest possible interpretation of the Supreme Court decision in the Smith Act case. We do not know whether the timing of the new crackdown was intended to divert attention from the FBI's continuing inability to catch the eight missing Communist chieftains; it surely would seem more logical—if the danger is clear and present—for the FBI to be spending all its time in pursuit of the eight elusive bigwigs rather than in unveiling these smaller fry.

Anyway our reaction to the new arrests is the same as our response to the earlier roundup, except perhaps a little more intense. For as the Justice Dept. digs down into the lower levels of the Communist apparatus the grotesqueness of the spectacle becomes even more pronounced. "11 Top Reds Seized," cried the Journal headline yesterday. How low can "top" be? Once again our republic proclaims that it is afraid of this motley band of discredited fanatics; once again the world hears that the United States is prosecuting men for the advocacy of ideas. Two of the new defendants are editors of a drab Communist newspaper published on the West Coast. Are their stale clichés a real peril to American freedom? In their initial dissents Justices Douglas and Black warned that we were embarking on a road alien to our noblest traditions. Each new arrest of undistinguished menaces confirms their warning.

For the benefit of anyone who came in late, we repeat: The Post warmly supports any prosecution for acts of espionage or sabotage committed by Communists or their agents. No such allegations are involved in these cases. The prosecutions are aimed at men's words and thoughts, not at their deeds. The proceedings can only be viewed throughout the world as a sign that we fear the feeble voices of the Kremlin's local mouthpieces. We say that the men responsible for these prosecutions—the Congressmen who drafted the Smith Act, the judges who have upheld it and the Justice Dept. sages who are applying it so overzealously—will one day be remembered with contempt by a calmer America.

There is no better cause for which men can fight now than the defense of our free institutions. We are engaged in a worldwide effort to defend freedom against Soviet imperialism. We must also protect Miss Liberty from those at home to whom the Bill of Rights has become a scrap of paper.

And we will.

No. 13

[From the New York Post, August 24, 1951]

AND AT HOME—

We were not yet lost either. Over the last year, it has been argued—and not always without reason—that no Communist or suspected Communist can get a fair trial any longer in an American court. But last Wednesday, a United States court of appeals ordered a new trial for William Remington, who had been convicted of perjury for denying that he had once belonged to the Communist Party.

The court found that a man cannot yet be sent to prison on the evidence of circumstance, that the Attorney General's list of subversive organizations is not yet holy writ, and that no danger, however clear and present, could permit a Government attorney like Irving Saypol to "arouse possible racial prejudice" by heckling a defense witness because he changed his name.

It could be argued that the Remington case is a small blessing from a court which has upheld the view that the Justice Dept. is justified in arresting Communists for what is at bottom only the expression of an idea, however unlovely. But there remains the fact. In a moment when every act of the Dept. of Justice is sanctioned on the plea of public emergency, a high court has finally blown the whistle.

The world that we have known and men have died for is not yet at an end.

No. 14

[From the New York Post, August 28, 1951]

FAMOUS LOST WORDS

In case you've missed it, we hereby record as a public service the news that FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover (or his ghost) is writing a series of articles for Hearst's International News Service tediously analyzing the propaganda line of the Communists. We doubt that most Americans will learn anything they didn't know before. So far Hoover's prose hasn't produced a shocker, or even a line that could be mildly described as a revelation. But we'll keep watching. Before it's over we're hoping the FBI Chief (or his ghost) will get down to business and tell us where Communist leaders go when they elude the FBI.

No. 15

[From the New York Post, June 12, 1952]

THE MAN PROTESTS TOO MUCH

There is still no more sensitive man around than FBI Director Hoover. He usually reacts to criticism with the judicious calm of an old maid in the presence of a young mouse. The distinguished magazine Commentary is merely the last of a very short list of publications to suggest that the FBI, like the post office and the Supreme Court, is staffed by human beings, some of whom aren't nearly as brilliant as they're cracked up to be in the movies. And Hoover has responded with a characteristically bitter and savage attack on the magazine and its contributor.

Five months ago Commentary published *The Day the FBI Came to Our House* by Harry Gersh. It was a firsthand report of a family's experience with a pair of FBI investigators who were seeking information on an alleged subversive. The author happened to be something of a seasoned expert on these matters after long years of anti-Communist activity in the labor movement. He concluded quietly that the pair of FBI agents "were not qualified to determine whether a man was or wasn't" a Red.

In other Government agencies this kind of restrained criticism might have prompted a quiet review of the incident and a second look at the personnel involved. But, as usual, Hoover countered with nothing less than an intemperate assault on the integrity of the author, the editor, and the publication. In a letter published in the current issue of Commentary, the FBI chief attacks the writer for "intentional ridicule," deliberate "distortion" and clear intent to give "an exaggerated and unfair account."

Hoover (who did not sit in on the interview) then alleges that the account written by Gersh (who was there) differed from the report of his two agents. In Hoover's simple view, this means only one thing: Gersh is a dishonest if not dangerous fellow, and Commentary editor Elliot Cohen was derelict in not letting the FBI edit his copy.

Hoover's irresponsible volunteer press agents have always "defended" the FBI by defaming anyone who doesn't cheer its every move and method. This tattered tactic has done more to bring the FBI and Hoover himself into public ridicule than any severe words from their critics.

Immunity from criticism is often the cruellest fate that can befall a public official. Hoover has again shown how dangerous it is by showing us what it's done to him.

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